

***IDA***

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Exercise  
Cooperative Safeguard 1997 (CS-97)  
After Action Report**

A. Martin Lidy, Project Leader  
Samuel H. Packer

October 1997

Approved for public release;  
distribution unlimited.

IDA Document D-2080

Log: H 97-002770

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

19980227 043

This work was conducted under contract DASW01 94 C 0054, Task T-H9-1323, for the U.S. Atlantic Command. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.

© 1997, 1998 Institute for Defense Analyses, 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1772 • (703) 845-2000.

This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (10/88).

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

IDA Document D-2080

**U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Exercise  
Cooperative Safeguard 1997 (CS-97)  
After Action Report**

A. Martin Lidy, Project Leader  
Samuel H. Packer

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

## **PREFACE**

This report was produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in partial fulfillment of the task titled "Analytical Support for USACOM: Exercise Cooperative Safeguard 97," sponsored by the U.S. Atlantic Command. The report was prepared for the Director, Plans and Policy, and the Director, Joint Training, USACOM.

The document was reviewed by the IDA personnel who observed the exercise, and by the Operational Evaluation Division Director, Mr. Thomas P. Christie.

**U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND (USACOM)  
EXERCISE COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD 1997 (CS-97)  
AFTER ACTION REPORT**

<b>A.</b>	<b>BACKGROUND.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>EXERCISE SCENARIO .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>NATO'S EXERCISE PARTICIPATION.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>D.</b>	<b>PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE EXERCISE.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>EXERCISE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>F.</b>	<b>ANALYSIS OF EXERCISE RESULTS AND RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS.....</b>	<b>8</b>
	1. Overall Exercise Results .....	8
	2. The Command Post Exercise .....	9
	3. The Live Exercise Phase of the Exercise.....	12
	4. Other Exercise Support Operations.....	32
<b>G.</b>	<b>PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>34</b>
	1. Command, Control, and Communications.....	34
	2. Information Management.....	41
	3. Logistics Support.....	46
	4. Exercise Planning .....	49
	5. Administrative Operations .....	53

Appendix A – Participating Elements
Appendix B – Exercise Events
Appendix C – Distinguished Visitors
Appendix D – Supporting Documentation
Appendix E – Acronyms

**LIST OF FIGURES**

1.	Cooperative Safeguard '97 Exercise Area.....	5
2.	CJTF Resource Spreadsheet .....	43
3.	Historical Summary of SAR Team Activities .....	45

## LIST OF TABLES

1.	Summary of Participating and Supporting Exercise Personnel .....	2
2.	STX Presentations .....	14
3.	NATO Command Field Exercise Elements .....	16
4.	CJTF Definition of SAR Capabilities .....	27
5.	Level of Capabilities of National SAR Teams .....	28

**U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND (USACOM)**  
**EXERCISE COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD 1997 (CS-97)**  
**AFTER ACTION REPORT**

Exercise COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD 97 was the first NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise to be hosted by the Government of Iceland and one of the first PfP exercises to use a natural disaster as the scenario. The exercise was scheduled by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and was conducted in two phases by the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT).

The exercise was executed as two major activities separated by more than 30 days. A 3-day command post exercise (CPX) with more than 60 NATO participants was held in June, and the live exercise (LIVEX) events were held in July with more than 500 NATO participants from 8 NATO member and 11 partner nations. The Government of Iceland (GOI) exercised and trained personnel of their national civil defense organizations during the exercise. Many of the personnel are volunteers, and the major exercise events were scheduled over weekends to accommodate the volunteers' work schedules. More than 1,100 Icelandic personnel participated in the exercise, including representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Organization for National Civil Defense, the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration, the Icelandic Public Roads Administration, and a number of local Private Voluntary Organizations<sup>1</sup> (PVOs).

Other participants included representatives from the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development who formed the On Site Operations Coordination Center, and a group of experienced disaster relief personnel from Fairfax County, Virginia, and Metro-Dade, Florida, Fire and Rescue Departments who evaluated the procedures used by the response teams. In addition, the GOI invited members of the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning and the Israeli Home Front Command to evaluate the Organization for National Civil Defense participation in the exercise. A

---

<sup>1</sup> The GOI has agreements with three local voluntary relief organizations, each of which participated in the exercise: the Icelandic Red Cross, the Life Saving Association, and the Association of Icelandic Rescue Teams.

summary of participants is shown in Table 1, and a complete list of NATO participants is provided at Appendix A.

**Table 1. Summary of Participating and Supporting Exercise Personnel**

	GOI	NATO	Total
<b>Exercise Participants</b>			
Command and Control	112	86	198
Field Operations	558	214	772
Air Operations	8	111	119
Maritime Operations	-	60	60
Engineering Planning	23	8	31
<b>Exercise Support Personnel</b>			
Directing Staff	150	9	159
Role Players	250	-	250
Information and Visitor Support	-	27	27
Base Support and Drivers/Escorts	29	49	78
Evaluators	12	12	24
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,142</b>	<b>576</b>	<b>1,718</b>

## **A. BACKGROUND**

Exercise COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD 97 (CS-97) resulted from discussions held by senior officials of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), NATO's Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), and the GOI in early 1996. These discussions achieved general agreement on an exercise concept that supported the interests of all parties. The GOI, as a charter member of NATO with no military force, sought practical steps to reinforce its ties within the Alliance in the current environment, while initiating activities that had both political and economic value to the nation. USACOM and ACLANT were interested in sponsoring initiatives that continued their support of the PfP Program, further developed NATO's evolving Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, and provided the GOI with an opportunity to establish links with the PfP program. These officials were also interested in conducting exercises that would enhance coordination with the international response community during a natural disaster in Iceland, because



there is a high probability of a major earthquake occurring in that region. Consequently, the Director of Iceland's Organization for National Civil Defense [*Almannavarnir Ríkisins* (AVRIK)] was designated the exercise director, and this was the first NATO exercise directed by a civilian.

## **B. EXERCISE SCENARIO**

The scenario for the exercise simulated a catastrophic earthquake in the southwest peninsula region of Iceland. For exercise purposes, the earthquake epicenter was assumed to be approximately 20 kilometers from Reykjavik, the national capital, near the popular ski resort in the Blue Mountains. The earthquake was assumed to measure 7.6 on the Richter scale, resulting in extensive damage to buildings, structures, and roads. The situation was further complicated by adverse weather conditions assumed for the exercise, with strong winds and heavy precipitation making the rescue work extremely difficult and hazardous. The number of casualties assumed for the disaster was significant and a large number of Icelanders in the region were also left homeless, resulting in a declaration of national disaster by the GOI.

The National Civil Defense Council of Iceland, supported by AVRIK, immediately responded to the emergency by deploying its available response and assessment teams into the field. Based upon the initial reports, AVRIK notified the Council that national resources were overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster. At the suggestion of AVRIK, the GOI requested international assistance, including a request for help from NATO. Several partner nations joined the responding members of NATO and provided resources to assist Iceland.

## **C. NATO'S EXERCISE PARTICIPATION**

A Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters was established by the local NATO commander, Island Commander Iceland (ISCOMICELAND), located at the Naval Air Station (NAS) at Keflavik, to command and control the resources provided by the NATO member and partner nations, and to coordinate the employment of those resources in support of the GOI. The CJTF headquarters was established in the Joint Command Post (JCP) at NAS Keflavik and was manned by personnel selected from each of the participating nations. The CJTF also established a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Cell with the United Nations On Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) located at the AVRIK Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Reykjavik.

The Iceland's incident commanders (IC) submitted requests for assistance at the disaster sites to the Civil Defense Center (CDC) in each region. Requests for assistance from the CDCs were coordinated by AVRIK within the EOC. When the requirement exceeded the Icelandic capabilities, the standard procedures for providing international disaster assistance established by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) were used for the exercise. Requests were passed from the national authorities at the EOC to the OSOCC. The OSOCC evaluated these requests and coordinated the required support among the available non-Icelandic organizations, including the CJTF's CIMIC Cell. If the CJTF had the requested resources available, the CIMIC Cell passed the request to the CJTF J-3 where appropriate elements were tasked. The J-3 informed the CIMIC Cell of the tasking and it in turn notified the OSOCC. The OSOCC then notified the EOC that their request for international assistance was being met and which organization would provide the support. A summary list of exercise events used to trigger participant response is provided at Appendix B.

Within the CJTF headquarters, the J-4 maintained the current status of all disaster response teams and availability of logistical resources, but tasking was accomplished by the J-3. Tasking for search and rescue, medical assistance, and ground transportation support was processed through the Logistics Readiness Cell (LRC) established by the task force at the Keflavik High School (KHS) where the national teams were billeted during the LIVEX phase of the exercise. Tasking for air support was processed through the Air Operations Cell located in the 56th Rescue Squadron (USAF) hangar at the NAS Keflavik airfield. The CJTF headquarters coordinated air movement of teams and resources with these cells. Ground movement control of task force elements was accomplished by a team located at KHS that reported these movements to the J-4. Air movements were controlled by the NAS Keflavik tower within its control zone and by the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration (ICAA) elsewhere.

The exercise area shown in Figure 1 was approximately 90 kilometers long and 55 kilometers wide, including the capital city of Reykjavik and NAS Keflavik. The exercise area, largely volcanic rock with some lakes and fields and small towns, was sub-divided into three areas that conformed to the Icelandic Civil Defense Regions. Icelandic exercise control headquarters were established in each region to manage the events and to provide the role players with life support. Area One headquarters was located in the town of Vogar just east of NAS Keflavik. Area Two headquarters was located in Kopavagur, a suburb of Reykjavik. Area Three headquarters was in the town




Figure 1. Cooperative Safeguard '97 Exercise Area

of Hveragard, about 25 kilometers southeast of Reykjavik. Central control of the exercise was managed from another site located in Kopavagur.

A total of 43 separate disaster sites were selected by AVRIK and coordinated with the local officials and the staff of U.S. Iceland Defense Force (IDF) to ensure they could be used during the exercise and would allow adequate communications connectivity. The exercise sites were then prepared in a very realistic manner by Icelandic volunteers. Sites established on NAS Keflavik for the STX were prepared by the Base Fire Department. An Icelandic incident commander was designated for each site by the local Chief of Police and an Icelandic site controller/safety officer was also present at each site. Many of the sites were used by both Icelandic and NATO response teams, and this enabled them to work together under the direction of the Icelandic incident commander. A total of 110 exercise events were conducted at the exercise sites.

There were 29 additional locations designated for use during the exercise. Twenty-three were used as helicopter landing zones, three were planned as air drop zones, and three were used as medical treatment sites. The landing zones were used by the 12 helicopters employed during the exercise. They transported personnel and equipment of the exercise teams between NAS Keflavik and the field sites, evacuated role playing victims to the medical sites, and flew the distinguished visitors to the sites so they could observe the key events. One air drop site was used to deliver the Russian field hospital and its crew by parachute from a fixed wing transport (a Russian IL-76) in Area 3. Estonia and Latvia also established and operated medical treatment facilities in Areas 1 and 2, respectively.

#### **D. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE EXERCISE**

During the exercise concept development, the planners considered many options, and balanced exercise realism and utilization of participating teams against event complexity and available funding to ensure the exercise would achieve its primary objectives. Once the concept for the exercise was determined, planning for CS-97 was conducted in a series of formal conferences, and between the conferences, with close coordination and continuous preparation by the staffs of the organizations responsible for the exercise. These headquarters included USACOM, CINCEASTLANT, ISCOMICELAND, the IDF and AVRIK.

Four formal exercise planning meetings included a Pre-Initial Planning Conference (IPC) in Reykjavik on 10 and 11 April 1996, the IPC held at the Partnership

Coordinating Cell (PCC) Mons, Belgium, from 12 to 13 June 1996, the Main Planning Conference (MPC) at Reykjavik 13 to 15 November, and the Final Planning Conference (FPC) in Reykjavik 8 to 10 March 1997. Representatives of participating nations were invited and encouraged to attend the planning conferences.

The principal exercise events in Iceland were the CPX conducted from 6 to 8 June 1997 and the LIVEX between 19 and 31 July 1997. The CPX provided training for the CJTF staff and also served as the final planning conference for LIVEX phase which included both a Situational Training Exercise (STX) and a Command Field Exercise (CFX). The LIVEX phase was supported by a major senior level distinguished visitor program and a pro-active public affairs policy. A total of 39 distinguished visitors listed in Appendix C, hosted by General John J. Sheehan USMC, assigned both as SACLANT and Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Command, observed the various events during the CFX phase of the LIVEX.

#### **E. EXERCISE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES**

The aim of the exercise was to foster interoperability among participating NATO forces at the unit and staff level through the practice of combined humanitarian relief techniques, communications procedures, and search and rescue in support of and in cooperation with the GOI and AVRIK. The exercise, while focused on training mid-level (field grade) officers in NATO staff procedures and coordination between civil and military organizations during a simulated natural disaster, also fostered hands on field training and cooperation among the national teams participating in the LIVEX, and with the host nation response teams.

There were six main objectives established by NATO for CS-97:

1. Exercise command, control, and logistics support of a multinational disaster relief force.
2. Exercise coordination with non-government organizations.
3. Exercise coordination with civil population (government, media, residents, victims).
4. Exercise combined humanitarian and search/rescue operations.
5. Gain support for NATO and the PfP program.
6. Gain experience in cooperation between civil, military, and paramilitary organizations and develop lessons learned for future operations.

## **F. ANALYSIS OF EXERCISE RESULTS AND RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS**

This section summarizes the results of the exercise. It provides an overall analysis of how well the exercise met its intended purpose, aims, and objectives. The section also summarizes the results achieved during the CPX and LIVEX phases of the exercise based upon the established primary analysis objectives for these events, and recommends actions to improve similar exercises in the future.

### **1. Overall Exercise Results**

The exercise was a success at every level. It met the purposes of the GOI and those of the U.S. and NATO authorities while accomplishing its aim of fostering interoperability among the participants. The military staffs worked together with the GOI civilian authorities both during preparations for the exercise and during the conduct of the command post and field training exercises. Unit interoperability training began with the deployment from home station on allied aircraft, and continued during the number of live exercise events that required close cooperation with other military units and their special equipment, the GOI civilian authorities, and the private voluntary organizations also participating in the exercise. The exercise also achieved each of its six main objectives.

The dynamic environment of Iceland provides a realistic setting for a wide range of disaster relief scenarios. When coupled to the experienced and professional governmental and non-governmental disaster assistance organizations located there, hosting NATO PfP exercises that focus on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance affords the GOI the unique opportunity to lend its support to this important NATO training initiative. NATO and U.S. headquarters share an operational military facility located in Iceland and the military staffs worked closely with Icelandic authorities to make CS-97 a success. Subsequent exercises should build on this foundation and close cooperation established during this exercise and continue it as at least a biennial event, subject to concurrence by authorities of the GOI and NATO.

Because this initial exercise sought to establish and train a CJTF staff and provide units with hands on field training, the scenario introduced a somewhat artificially compressed time line so that the NATO response could be fielded. Future exercises should consider a more realistic scenario that incorporates any GOI bilateral arrangements for assistance and the existing IDF plan for support of the GOI should a major disaster occur. The immediately available military response capabilities could

then be added to as additional member and partner nations arrived and the immediately available U.S. command and control nucleus could be expanded and transitioned into a NATO CJTF as the additional resources are provided.

During a disaster, assistance is requested and provided based on specifically identified needs. In this exercise, the available capabilities were provided by the member and partner nations and the exercise events were tailored where necessary to accommodate the training for all of the teams that participated. This exercise artificiality may leave the participants with an incorrect representation of the disaster assistance process. To eliminate this potential problem, it would be helpful to conduct a seminar for the participating staff prior to the CPX phase. The seminar would stress why and how joint and combined assessments are conducted with the affected host nation and the international community responding to large scale disasters. The seminar should highlight the importance of these assessments and the impact they are likely to have on the structure of the military capabilities deployed during actual contingency operations. The seminar could also contrast, especially for the allied participants, the differences between planning and execution of real disaster assistance and the artificialities that were necessary to make the exercise a useful experience for the participants.

## **2. The Command Post Exercise**

The command post exercise was an essential phase of CS-97 because it prepared the staff participants to carry out their duties as members of the CJTF headquarters and key supporting operational elements during the LIVEX. The first half day of the CPX phase of the exercise was used to brief the participants on a number of important subjects such as the environment of Iceland and the organization of the Icelandic Civil Defense, the NATO policies and procedures for employing military resources in disasters, and the evolving concepts and doctrine related to the CJTF. The afternoon was used to orient the staff with a tour of the various facilities that would be used in support of the exercise. These facilities included the JCP and Air Operations Cell at Keflavik NAS, the high school where the teams would be housed and furnished life support during the LIVEX, and the EOC in Reykjavik. The staff orientation, however, did not provide a tour of the exercise area which would have been helpful to orient personnel, who were to serve on the CJTF staff and at the other supporting nodes, on the general terrain, distances, and transportation requirements the units would encounter when tasked.

The second and third day of the CPX were used to organize the participants and deploy them to the JCP, the EOC, and other locations where they played the roles of

CJTF staff and operating cells. The Directing Staff (DISTAFF) initiated 10 messages each day through five Icelandic Civil Defense Regions that were activated for each exercise day. These messages were processed through the EOC and the OSOCC to the CJTF headquarters. Tasks were assigned by the J-3 and messages were passed by the staff to the appropriate response cells for action. This activity provided the staffs at each echelon with the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the facilities, employ and modify the established procedures so that the CJTF could respond more effectively, and employ and stress the available communications systems. Many staff positions were rotated on the third day to enable the participants to broaden their understanding of staff responsibilities and the operation of the CJTF headquarters.

There were three primary analysis objectives established for the CPX phase of the exercise:

- Identify shortfalls in planning, preparation, and procedures for the CPX phase.
- Identify interoperability issues for NATO/PfP CJTF staff and command post operations.
- Assess the practicability and utility of the CJTF staff and Directing Staff (DISTAFF) organizations in order to make refinements for the LIVEX (STX and CFX) phases.

The analysis of the CPX phase of the exercise based on these objectives follows.

#### **a. Planning, Preparation, and Procedures**

(1) **Planning Conferences** – There were four planning conferences held to arrange this exercise, including the pre-IPC. These conferences held between June 1996 and March 1997 were necessary to coordinate the details of a very complex set of events involving a number of relatively small organizations that typically have no contact with each other. These conferences and the staff coordination accomplished between them has established a useful foundation and understanding among the participating organizations. With the CPX scheduled more than a month before the LIVEX, this event also served as an additional conference for representatives to resolve last minute details. There was sufficient time allowed to accomplish thorough planning. If similar exercises are scheduled in the future, there probably is little need for the pre-IPC, but the details of funding and deploying the participating teams, as well as the work needed to develop the exercise orders, the briefings, and the Major Scenario Event List (MSEL) will still require as a minimum the normal three conferences.



(2) **Staff Orientation Briefings** – All of the briefings provided to familiarize the staff were given in English, but were not well coordinated in advance. The cultural briefing provided by the GOI was interesting, but longer than the time allocated. The briefing on the operation of AVRIK and Civil Defense provided a good picture of how the EOC would operate; less information was provided as to how civil defense was organized throughout Iceland, how the regional and local elements would operate in an actual disaster, and the agency's experience gained during previous exercises and real events. The NATO and CJTF briefings were coordinated and provided complementary information. The UNDHA briefing was focused more on its administrative organization in Geneva and New York and less on the organization, mission, and procedures of the OSOCC when international assistance is requested. Future exercises should ensure that these briefings focus on topics that enhance understanding of the process, identify the capabilities of responding organizations, and describe the procedures they use in the field so the CJTF will be able to interface and work together with these elements to achieve unity of effort.

(3) **Tracking Procedures for Assistance Requests** – During the CPX, each of the ten Icelandic requests for support from the OSOCC was identified by a number from 1 to 10. This number often became confused with the serial number used to enter information on the boards employed at the OSOCC, the CIMIC Cell, and the CJTF. Moreover, mission numbers were then assigned within the CJTF once the resource was tasked causing additional confusion for the staff. AVRIK uses a three digit number for actual operations and this method was used with success during the LIVEX.

(4) **Status of Resources** – Procedures for tracking the status of NATO resources available to the CJTF such as search and rescue teams, medical teams, and ground and air transportation elements were not well established. A common picture of the status for each of these key elements should be available at the JCP and with the CIMIC Team located with the OSOCC. On the second day of the CPX, a status board was set up in the JCP by the J-4, but similar information was not provided to the CIMIC Cell where it was needed.

#### **b. Interoperability Issues**

The major interoperability issue surfaced during the CPX was the lack of adequate English language skills for many of the participants from partner nations. The exercise instructions specified that English would be the working language of CS-97 and that staff and liaison officers who participate should be proficient in English to level

3333 in accordance with NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 6601. Many of the participants met the language requirements; however, because language skills were lacking in many others, significant delays were encountered when messages were received or sent, or when status updates were required. The individuals were serving as staff officers in the combined headquarters and must be able to conduct effective oral and written communication because it is not practical to provide each with his or her own translator. The use of Personal Computers (PCs) linked by electronic mail could improve the interoperability of these sections by making it easier to exchange status or provide timely reports to the various staffs and sections. If standard screen displays and report formats were used at the various nodes, it could reduce the number of telephonic or fax communications and the associated manual transcribing that these forms of communication require, and might make the staff more interoperable even with less than required English language skills.

#### **c. CJTF and DISTAFF Organizations**

The organization and staffing of the CJTF and DISTAFF were carefully arranged both to ensure that technically competent personnel were assigned to the positions and to achieve balance and integration among the participating nations. The size of the CJTF staff sections during the CPX was larger than was necessary because this event was used to train the participants in their duties and the work period was for less than a full day each day. During the CFX, the staffs operated on a 24-hour basis with lower staffing levels for each shift. The DISTAFF was sufficient to oversee the various operating nodes and to simulate the elements that were not staffed during the CPX. Establishing the OSOCC with United Nations representation during the CPX also added to the realism of the exercise and allowed the participants to employ the international procedures developed by these organizations during a number of actual disasters.

### **3. The Live Exercise Phase of the Exercise**

The Live Exercise was conducted from 18 to 31 July and included the deployment of forces to Iceland, the opening ceremony, a Situational Training Exercise, a Cultural Day, a Command Field Exercise, the closing ceremony, a hot wash up, and the redeployment of forces to home stations. During the LIVEX period, a team of 8 engineer planners from U.S. Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) 7 also worked separately with 23 members of the Icelandic Highway Administration to assess and develop solutions to potential engineering problems that were likely to occur in the

affected area. The discussion that follows briefly describes the LIVEX events and then provides an analysis of how well this phase of the exercise met its objectives.

**a. Situational Training Exercise (STX)**

The STX events were conducted on 22 and 23 July. The STX was an important step in preparing participants for the CFX which followed. The STX was divided into four half day training periods and began with a series of briefings for all NATO participants. The remaining three periods involved parallel training for three categories of participants – the field response teams, the air crews, and the CJTF headquarters staffs.

(1) **Initial Briefings** – The initial briefings for the NATO exercise participants were conducted in the NAS Keflavik theater. The presentations given in English included the topics listed in Table 2. The NATO and PfP staff officers and team leaders participating in the exercise were required to have English language skills, but other participants, particularly the junior members of the national response teams, were not required to have similar English language skills. Consequently, a large portion of the audience received little to no benefit from these presentations. This problem was anticipated by IDF and AVRIK, and as a result AVRIK distributed a Field Event Guideline pamphlet<sup>2</sup> to the participants attending the presentation that was available in either English or Russian so that all participants would have a basic understanding of the rules of play during the exercise. Planners of future PfP exercises should consider the language skills of all participants and schedule briefings for audiences that understand the language. They should also ensure that information critical to the conduct of the exercise is disseminated in as many languages as necessary so that it will be understood by all participants.

(2) **Field Response Team Training** – After the introductory briefings, the field response teams were formed into three groups to mix national teams and allow them to work together at three training lanes established at NAS Keflavik. The training also provided an opportunity for some national teams to demonstrate their unique capabilities to the other participants.

The **medical training lane** was operated by the NAS Keflavik hospital. This training included a demonstration of the PC-based medical translating software that

---

<sup>2</sup> Copies of the Field Event Guidelines in both languages are included in Appendix D.

enables doctors and patients who have no common language to communicate through a standard set of questions and responses stored in multiple languages. Additional training included the correct procedures to use when completing and using the standard international casualty cards employed during the exercise. Participants were also given a tour of the U.S. hospital facilities during this period. The Austrian team demonstrated rope procedures for moving casualties from upper levels of damaged structures and allowed the national teams to try the techniques.

**Table 2. STX Presentations**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Presenter</b>
Opening Remarks and Welcome	IDF and GOI
Iceland Orientation and Briefing	NAS Keflavik
Safety Briefing	NAS Keflavik
GOI Disaster Response	AVRIK
Overview of Exercise Scenario	AVRIK
CJTF Structure and Operations	J-3
Exercise Schedule	J-3
Exercise Rules of Play	AVRIK
Opening Ceremony	EASTLANT

The **automobile extrication training lane** was set up and operated by the NAS Keflavik Fire Department. The purpose of this training was to encourage the national teams to work together on a number of difficult victim extractions from vehicles damaged in simulated accidents. The sites were realistically set up by the Fire Department and required the teams to determine the status of victims, provide them life support while the car bodies were cut open so the victims could be extracted, and evacuate the victims to medical treatment facilities. The Fire Department personnel acted as incident commanders and briefed the team leaders on the situation in English. The national teams were able to demonstrate their capabilities to cut through difficult materials and provide medical support to the victims with rescue and medical teams of different nations working together at the sites. The Russian team demonstrated a technique for rappelling fire fighting and medical crews from a helicopter. The crews

put out an automobile fire with hand-held extinguishers and blankets. They then removed the simulated victim and evacuated him by helicopter. This technique is often used in Russian cities.

The **search and rescue training lane** was also set up and operated by the NAS Keflavik Fire Department. A duplex set of family quarters that was scheduled for destruction was partially knocked down and dummies, as well as role-playing casualties, were placed in the collapsed buildings. National team leaders were briefed in English by the incident commanders from the Fire Department on the situation and then encouraged to work together with other search and rescue and medical teams to locate and remove the simulated victims. The buildings were wood structures and this gave teams an opportunity to employ other tools and techniques as well as work together in the simulated environment.

(3) **Air Crew Training** – While the other groups were conducting training, the air crews were briefed on local flight procedures and safety of operations. Many of the crews also conducted reconnaissance flights of the operational area, and the Russian helicopter crew gave three demonstrations for the field teams. Some of the helicopters also made practice landings on the flight deck of the Norwegian Coast Guard Cutter.

(4) **CJTF Headquarters Training** – The Chief of Staff of the CJTF conducted training in the JCP for the staff members. The training period included testing the communications equipment, computers, and other supporting equipment; working out shift assignments for the 24 hour per day operation; and reviewing the reporting formats and staff procedures, especially those used for briefing the commander and incoming staff when scheduled shift changes occurred. Some of the communications equipment and computer software was added to the JCP as a result of experience gained during the CPX, and additional training was required for this new equipment.

#### **b. Command Field Exercise (CFX)**

The CFX, conducted from 25 to 27 July, was the principal event of CS-97. The earthquake was assumed to occur at 1600 hours on 24 July. The exercise was initiated at 0800 hours on 25 July with activation of the EOC, the JCP, the LRC, and selected exercise sites. The Icelandic teams were tasked and started their operations during the morning while the other international and NATO resources were assumed to be arriving in Iceland in response to the GOI request for assistance. The initial tasking for NATO teams was planned to start about 1200 hours on 25 July. The CFX was conducted on a

24-hour basis with events scheduled throughout the exercise period until approximately 1500 hours on 27 July. All tasks initiated on 27 July were to be completed before the teams were released.

The NATO participants fielded the land, air, and maritime elements shown in Table 3.

**Table 3. NATO Command Field Exercise Elements**

<b>Land Elements</b>	<b>SAR Teams</b>	<b>Medical Teams</b>	<b>Hospitals</b>
Austria	2		
Estonia	2	2	1
Latvia		2	1
Lithuania	1		
Romania	2		
Russia	1	2	1
Ukraine	1		
<b>Air Elements (helicopters)</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Number</b>	
Iceland	Aerospatiale Dolphin II SA-J65N	1	
Lithuania	MI-8	1	
Norway	Lynx	1	
Russia	Bo105	1	
United States	CH-47	3	
	HH-60	2	
	UH-60	3	
<b>Maritime Element</b>	<b>Ships</b>		
Norwegian Coast Guard	Cutter <i>Andennes</i>		

The first major NATO event conducted during the morning of 25 July was the parachute delivery of the Russian hospital and crew in Area 3, the most distant region from NAS Keflavik, and this event was observed by the distinguished visitors. The Russian hospital was deployed to establish a forward medical treatment capability for the exercise in one of the areas most badly damaged by the simulated earthquake. At the same time, Estonian and Latvian hospitals also were established in the other two exercise areas; they were delivered by surface transportation. The weather in the drop zone was marginal with rain and low ceilings. The Russian aircraft made the parachute drops

using radar vectors from the ICAA and an onboard global positioning system (GPS). The drop was successful, but the loads landed approximately one kilometer from the intended landing site. The problem was quickly corrected using a CH-47 helicopter, which also provided an unscheduled demonstration of U.S. and Russian equipment interoperability.

The other exercise events were initiated by Icelandic controllers at various sites in the three regions based on a daily schedule developed by the DISTAFF. This schedule ensured that the sites were prepared and used effectively, and that victims were available at the site before the teams began to arrive.

The initiating message was transmitted by the controller at the site using a cellular phone to the appropriate regional Civil Defense Center. The regional headquarters made its assessment and dispatched available Icelandic resources to accomplish the task. If the task was beyond the capabilities of available Icelandic resources, the request for additional resources was sent by facsimile to the EOC. The EOC processed the request for assistance by tasking other available Icelandic resources, or requesting support from the OSOCC if additional capabilities were needed. The request was then coordinated by the OSOCC and CIMIC Cell, and was sent to the CJTF for action if CJTF resources to handle the task were available. The CJTF then determined which team to send and instructed the LRC to alert and dispatch the team. This arrangement made for a very long tasking chain. In an actual emergency, some of the available NATO Search and Rescue (SAR) resources might be placed under the tactical control (TACON) of local authorities in a seriously affected region, as was the case with the NATO medical treatment facilities. This would increase the complexity of providing logistical support to the forward deployed teams, but could reduce considerably the response times during the emergency. Aviation and maritime assets, however, should probably remain centrally managed because of their small number and unique logistical requirements.

Once CJTF tasking started during the afternoon of the first exercise day, eleven SAR missions were conducted by the NATO teams that day, including the night shift. Tasking from the EOC followed the procedures established during the CPX, with the CJTF determining which teams would respond and coordinating necessary transportation for the teams to the sites. During the first day, SAR teams from Russia were deployed to Area 3, while Lithuanian and Romanian teams deployed to Area 2, and Estonian, Austrian, and Ukrainian teams worked in Area 1. Teams were transported to the sites by surface or by helicopter. At the sites, the teams reported to the Icelandic incident commanders to receive their instructions, and, in many cases, the teams were required to

work with Icelandic teams that were already on site, but needed heavier capabilities provided by the NATO teams to complete their tasks. The site commanders briefed the team leaders on the situation at the site, indicated the approximate number of victims and their locations, described potentially hazardous materials, and integrated the capabilities of the NATO teams with the Icelandic teams already on site. The NATO teams were rotated by the CJTF on subsequent days so that all teams were able to work with other incident commanders at different sites in all three regions.

The team leaders were required to report to the JCP by cellular phone when the team arrived at the site, 30 minutes after work began with an estimated completion time, when the task was completed, and when the team departed the site. The teams worked through the rubble at the sites to rescue the victims. Many sites were actual houses or industrial buildings that were partially demolished. Some sites were built in remote areas from old car bodies or other salvaged industrial tubes, steel, and gravel buried under concrete and other materials that were difficult to penetrate without the heavy equipment brought by some of the teams. The NATO teams were not able to deploy with their dogs because of Icelandic restrictions, but teams were given the opportunity to work with local dogs at some of the sites. Work continued until all casualties were evacuated, and in some cases this required four or more hours of work. NATO teams that were working near the shift change often continued to complete the task rather than requesting relief from another team from the later shift. In an actual situation, the duty cycles of teams should be maintained to ensure support can be provided for the duration of the emergency, and these cycles should be controlled by the CJTF headquarters better than they were during the exercise.

As casualties were located and extricated from the sites, they were treated by the medical personnel assigned to the teams and then evacuated to the NATO medical treatment facilities in each area. In some cases, victims were transported by helicopter, but when the distance was relatively short, they were evacuated by surface vehicles, usually provided by the Icelandic teams. At the NATO treatment facilities, the medical teams performed triage and simulated life saving operations. The victims were then transported by Icelandic vehicles to regional control headquarters where they were fed and provided other life support until required to become victims again.

The Norwegian cutter *Andennes* and its helicopter and small boats also participated in the exercise each day. The ship and its crew participated in scheduled mass casualty evacuations and transportation of homeless victims to simulated displaced person shelters and camps operated by the Icelandic Red Cross and AVRIK. The



maritime events were conducted at sites in a different region on each exercise day. The inclusion of these sea-based resources highlighted the valuable contributions a ship with its organic command and control, medical, helicopter, small boat, and self-contained operational and support capabilities provides to a disaster relief situation such as established in this exercise scenario.

### **c. Other Live Exercise Events**

This paragraph describes the seven additional events included as part of the LIVEX.

(1) **Deployment of Forces** – The NATO and PfP forces deployed to Iceland based on plans arranged by the national delegations and the exercise planning staff. The Russian and Ukrainian participants and their equipment arrived in national IL-76 transport aircraft. The Romanians arrived in two national C-130s. Other delegations were brought in by a Canadian C-130 or Air Mobility Command C-141s or C5s, and some of the Baltic teams were transported in the Ukrainian aircraft. The Lithuanians flew the MI-8 helicopter from Vilnius to Keflavik, a flight that required 13 hours over a three day period. The four PfP fixed wing transports with a large portion of the deploying exercise forces arrived within 45 minutes at NAS Keflavik on 20 July, and this caused some congestion and delays in processing the arriving forces at the Joint Reception Center (JRC) established in the air terminal. Coordinating the deployments was an additional task placed on the exercise planning staff, but one that should have been handled by the NATO Allied Mobility Coordination Cell (AMCC), an organization established to support both Major NATO Commands (MNCs) located in Mons, Belgium. Future exercises that require force deployments across national boundaries should include representatives of the AMCC.

All incoming personnel were recorded, assigned billeting, and provided transportation by the JRC, but there was no formal transfer of authority (TOA) over the forces from national authorities to the commander of the CJTF upon arrival. These NATO procedures should be practiced in all exercises. In addition, Iceland has not signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with any NATO member nation, but it has a special agreement with the United States Government (USG) that covers the status of U.S. forces while they are in Iceland. A special memorandum of agreement was concluded between SACLANT and the GOI to confer similar status upon the other NATO member and partner forces participating in the exercise. If the GOI would

complete SOFAs with NATO member and partner nations, similar special arrangements would not be necessary.

(2) **Opening Ceremony** – The opening ceremony was conducted at 1900 hours 21 July on the athletic fields at Keflavik High School where most of the NATO forces were billeted. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Mr. Halldor Asgrimmson, and the Deputy SACLANT, Vice Admiral I.D.G. Garnett, UK Navy, welcomed and addressed the participants who were grouped by national delegations in parade formation. Representatives of the Icelandic Organization for Civil Defense were invited but did not participate in this ceremony. Future exercises should encourage the host nation (and PVOs) to participate in the opening ceremony. Immediately following the ceremony, the delegations displayed to the public and other participants their special equipment, vehicles, and helicopters on the adjacent athletic field. The Icelandic organizations did participate in the equipment displays and saw for the first time the equipment brought by the NATO teams. Some of the volunteers who had prepared the exercise sites had underestimated the capabilities of these teams, and had to modify the sites prior to the CFX to make them more challenging. Although well covered by the press, the civilian attendance at the ceremony and equipment display was primarily from the local population of Keflavik. If the ceremony were held in Reykjavik, the civilian attendance would probably have been greater.

(3) **Cultural Day** – During the scheduled break between the STX and CFX on 24 July, the participants were given the opportunity to see Iceland. Buses took the participants on a tour of the geyser, the *Gullfoss* water falls, the city of Reykjavik, and other tourist sites. This tour provided the participants with an appreciation of the nation they were assisting during the exercise and the terrain over which they would be operating.

(4) **Closing Ceremony** – This ceremony was also held at the Keflavik High School athletic fields at 1000 hours on 28 July. The Commander of the CJTF, Rear Admiral J.E. Boyington, Jr. U.S. Navy, and the AVRIK Exercise Director, Ms. Solveig Thorvaldsdottir, addressed the participants. The Icelandic organizations were represented in this ceremony as was the Fire Department from NAS Keflavik. The head of each national delegation was presented with a stuffed Puffin. The mayor of Keflavik also presented to each delegation a small flag with the crest of the city.

(5) **Hot Wash Up** – A review of the exercise was conducted immediately following the closing ceremony on 28 July. The exercise director, the DISTAFF, the

United Nations OSOCC representatives, evaluators, and heads of national delegations were called upon to present orally their first impressions of the exercise. Written First Impression Reports and After Action Reports were also requested from each delegation. These oral and written comments and other evaluator observation reports were compiled and have been reflected in this report

**(6) Redeployment of Forces** – The forces were processed through the JRC based on the scheduled departures beginning on the afternoon of 28 July as coordinated by the exercise planning staff and the national delegations. Personnel accountability was terminated after processing through the JRC, and customs requirements were also handled at the air terminal. However, there was no requirement to exercise a transfer of authority from the commander of the CJTF to national command authorities. These procedures should be incorporated into future exercises. All participants received a silver medal on a ribbon in the national colors of Iceland. The medal was inscribed with the GOI crest on one side and the logo developed for the exercise on the other side.

**(7) Engineering Support** – While the various exercise events were being conducted, staff engineers from NCR 7 (Seabees) supported the Icelandic Highway Administration engineers as they worked on assessments and solutions to anticipated bridge damage and other engineering tasks that would be likely in the exercise area if the assumed earthquake should occur. The engineer teams addressed three specific master scenario event list items: the restoration of the *Kaldakvisl* River bridge, the construction of the *Grindavik* displaced person tent city, and well drilling and water storage in the disaster area. The bridge problem was to provide a temporary river crossing within 24 hours that spanned 150 feet. The solution needed to accommodate one way traffic for a service life of six months. Options examined were either construction of a Bailey Bridge or a culvert crossing. The bridge option was selected as the solution and detailed engineering plans were developed to complete the project within 24 hours, including 1,000 feet of approach road on each side of the 160-foot class 55-60 bridge. Designs for the tent city were developed to accommodate approximately 2,500 persons, and included power and sanitation requirements. The well drilling and water problems were also analyzed and engineering solutions were developed in conjunction with the host nation engineering staff.

#### **d. Analysis of the Live Exercise Phase**

There were three primary analysis objectives established for the LIVEX phase of the exercise:

- Identify shortfalls in planning, preparation, and procedures for the STX/FTX phases.
- Identify interoperability issues for NATO/PfP CJTF staff, command post operations, and field units.
- Assess the overall performance of the CJTF staff and field units against appropriate standards.

### **(1) Planning, Preparation, and Procedures**

The LIVEX phase was thoroughly planned and well executed; the following comments identify items for consideration in planning future exercises.

**(a) Transfer of Authority to the Commander of the CJTF** – When forces are provided to a NATO organization for a contingency or wartime operation, specific procedures are used to transfer authority over these forces from national authorities to the appropriate NATO command authority responsible for the operation. This action forms the legal basis for the NATO commander to exercise authority over the national forces during the period of the time they are employed by NATO. This action was not incorporated into the plan for the exercise, but should have been to enable the national and NATO authorities involved with the exercise to gain familiarity with the procedures, and to provide the commander of the CJTF with the legal authority to exercise control over the forces. Moreover, the existing NATO procedures for transfer of authority cover military elements, but some of the exercise participants were civilians or paramilitary elements provided by the national governments. These procedures should be reviewed to determine if they also extend to civilian and paramilitary elements that would likely be deployed in this type of contingency, or whether the NATO procedures require modification.

**(b) Deployment of Forces** – The exercise planning staff was required to devote significant effort to arranging and coordinating the deployment of national representatives for the various exercise planning conferences, the staff officers for the CPX, and the participating troops and equipment for the LIVEX. The Allied Mobility Coordination Cell (AMCC), located at Mons, Belgium, was established as a bi-MNC organization to coordinate movements across national borders. A representative from the AMCC should have been included on the exercise planning staff to provide this assistance, refine NATO procedures for deployment, and establish appropriate contacts within participating national headquarters.

**(c) Communications Artificialities** – For this inaugural exercise, communications support was planned to rely on the existing phone lines in Iceland and the available cellular phone network, and disruptions to communications were not planned as part of the exercise. However, during a disaster of the type simulated, many of the phone lines and cellular relay sites would be subjected to damage and probably would not be operational, particularly in the areas most heavily damaged where the teams would be assigned. There were no plans to employ radio communications, except those internal to the SAR teams or those required by the aircraft employed during the exercise. In future exercises radio communications should be planned and employed so that the CJTF could communicate with its deployed elements and with the AVRIK elements at all echelons, from the EOC to the incident commanders. In a future exercise, deploying additional communications units and equipment from participating nations would provide an opportunity to operate a number of networks using NATO procedures and enable participants with limited English language skills to practice radio discipline under realistic conditions.

**(d) Capabilities and Requirements of Teams and Equipment** – At several points during the planning conferences, teams were requested to specify their capabilities, to establish their detailed requirements for transportation by surface or helicopter, and to identify logistical requirements for their equipment. There was no format specified for the responses and this information was not provided by all of the nations until actual tasking began during the CFX. When it was provided, the information often did not include the level of detail that was actually needed. NATO should develop standard reporting formats for this type of information so that nations can respond with the necessary information at the level of detail needed by the CJTF.

**(e) Humanitarian Relief Information Availability** – During the extended planning period, the exercise planning staff was not familiar with all of the sources of information that are available on international humanitarian relief operational procedures, potential donor organizations, and capabilities of various responding organizations. This information is available from a number of sources such as United Nations agencies, international organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, the host nation, and various military publications. The *ad hoc* and part-time nature of these planning staffs generally does not provide them with sufficient resources to perform the extensive research and data collection that is needed to support planning and execution of such an exercise. This information should be collected, organized, and entered into a Web Page that can be easily accessed by the U.S. combatant command and component

staffs and NATO member and partner nations, to support exercises and actual contingency operations.

(f) **Concurrent Planning with Exercise Northern Viking** – Exercise Northern Viking is a biennial exercise conducted in Iceland to train forces to defend the island. The exercise was scheduled to follow CS-97, but some of the events actually overlapped. A major consideration for scheduling the two exercises so closely was the cost associated with transporting the U.S. Army helicopters employed in both exercises. To minimize the costs, the helicopters were deployed for CS-97 and remained through Northern Viking. However, most of the same military and civilian staffs had to plan both exercises simultaneously while performing their other duties. This schedule imposed an exceptional workload on the planning staffs, and given the political interest in CS-97, it was given priority focus. If CS-97 is repeated in Iceland, it should be scheduled during even years while Northern Viking remains scheduled during odd years so the staffs can devote adequate attention to each exercise.

(g) **Transition from IDF to CJTF** – The IDF, a U.S. force stationed in Iceland, has a disaster response instruction that would be implemented in the event of an actual disaster. Because the IDF already exists and has some capability with which to respond, it would serve as the principal military headquarters available in Iceland immediately after a disaster occurred. Any military resources provided by responding allied nations could be placed under the control of that organization upon arrival in Iceland. As the military response increased, the IDF could transition into a NATO commanded CJTF. Exactly how and when this would be accomplished is not covered in the existing IDF instruction. This transition from a U.S. joint command to a NATO CJTF is a realistic requirement that should be included as an objective in subsequent exercises.

(h) **Air Crew Training** – The Russian helicopter crew was scheduled to provide three demonstrations of rappelling during the STX. The crew arrived with the troops the day before the opening ceremony and had to unload and prepare the helicopter for flight. The helicopter was deployed to be part of the static equipment display following the ceremony. The next day, the crew attended the initial briefings in the theater and were then scheduled to have their air crew briefings during the afternoon session. By the time the first demonstration was scheduled, however, the crew had not yet received its orientation and safety briefings. This caused a delay for the first demonstration as the crew was instructed in procedures to file flight plans and the local flight rules for the airfield. The exercise planners need to ensure that air crews are adequately briefed prior to their first scheduled flight.

(i) **The Use of CIMIC Teams at Locations Other than the EOC** – The centralized tasking process used during the exercise only required CIMIC personnel to be employed at the EOC and JCP. During an actual disaster, the tasking chain would probably be decentralized with TACON of some of the military resources transferred to regional civil defense headquarters or in some cases, possibly incident commanders. In addition, coordination between military and other GOI civilian agencies may be required. The CIMIC planners should take into account these other requirements for CIMIC teams and either employ teams with these organizations or simulate them during the exercise.

(j) **Logistical Support** – Most of the logistical problems were anticipated during the planning process or were resolved when they were identified during execution. Two problems that were not completely resolved concerned feeding schedules and different shifts for response teams and their Icelandic escorts.

While SAR teams are required in actual contingencies to deploy in self-sustaining configuration for two weeks of operation, the exercise concept provided food for the teams. The feeding plan was to provide the participants with a morning and evening hot meal and a box lunch for the third meal. Because of the shift change schedule (0700 and 1900 hours), late tasking, and the distances to some of the sites, special feeding arrangements had to be made on one day with the caterer to ensure the teams received two hot meals when they were unable to meet the established feeding schedule. The feeding problem would be more complex if the field teams remained at forward locations rather than returning to the central facilities at the completion of the shift as this exercise required. This requirement should be anticipated and planned for during future exercises.

The shift change for the Icelandic escorts who accompanied the teams to the field sites occurred at 0800 and 2000 hours, one hour after the field teams changed shifts. Although the Icelandic drivers originally were intended to remain with their assigned team, some were reluctant to depart with the new team when their shift was scheduled to change an hour later. Accordingly, there were some delays in field team responses when tasking occurred near the shift change periods while teams waited for the escort from the next shift. Closer coordination between drivers and teams is needed during exercises and actual contingency operations.

(k) **Joint Assessments** – When a disaster occurs and the affected nation requests assistance, a joint needs assessment is conducted by the responding international community. Assistance provided by this community is coordinated based upon the

assessment so that only support that is needed is furnished. Exercises on the other hand are used to train, and the troop participation in this exercise was based on the interest of the participating nations. The exercise events were planned more to accommodate and train the force that participated than to meet the needs of the affected nation. The exercise should have included a training period for the CJTF staff officers to clarify this difference and to reinforce the importance of the joint needs assessment process during an actual contingency. This training should identify the key organizations that participate in the joint needs assessment, how an assessment is conducted, and the impact the assessment results will have on the mission, size, and composition of the CJTF.

## **(2) Interoperability**

Several interoperability items were identified during the LIVEX phase of the exercise.

**(a) English Language Capabilities** – Based on the CPX and LIVEX phases of this exercise, it is evident that the English language skills of many partner nations are less than specified by STANAG 6601. The use of pre-formatted messages, facsimile machines, and standard computer displays can assist less language qualified staff officers perform headquarters functions. However, when communicating on telephones or by radio, language proficiency is critical. The exercise requirement did not highlight the need for aviators to have English language skills because the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has adapted English as the standard aviation language. The Russian helicopter aircrews, however, were not English language qualified. The Russian and Lithuania helicopters were usually sent on the same mission during the exercise so that in flight instructions could be relayed from the Lithuanian crew, who spoke both English and Russian, to ensure safe operation.

**(b) Communications** – The exercise relied on commercial telephone lines and cellular phones for communications between the headquarters and other elements of the CJTF and AVRIK. Most of the national field teams had hand-held radios for internal communication with other members of the team, and these often could not be used to communicate between teams or with the Icelandic incident commanders. Although helicopters employed in the exercise had radios and could communicate with air traffic controllers, there were no ground-to-air radios used at the landing sites that processed large numbers of aeromedical evacuation sorties. The lack of ground-to-air radio communications at these heavily used sites increased the safety risks during the peak exercise periods.



(c) **Common Picture of Resource Tasking** – Because of problems identified during the CPX, the planning staff developed a set of standard computer displays to track resource tasking. The display was maintained in the JCP, but a common picture was not automatically provided to the CIMIC Cell at the EOC, the Air Operations Cell, or the LRC. A common picture at each CJTF location, generated by computer, would have provided each location with accurate and timely information needed to perform its tasks, and reduced considerably the number of phone calls or facsimile messages that were necessary to achieve an approximate picture of resource tasking.

(d) **Equipment and Team Interoperability** – Most of the teams were structured and equipped with sufficient resources to complete tasks independently. A method was developed by the CJTF headquarters to identify specific capabilities of the various SAR teams. Table 4 identifies the three levels of capabilities used during the exercise

**Table 4. CJTF Definition of SAR Capabilities**

Level	Search	Rescue	Medical	Rope Rescue
1	Dogs (no rescue dogs deployed with teams)	Concrete with iron bar, steel, major shoring	Doctors	High Angle
2	Seismic/Acoustic, Video, Fiber Optics	Timber/wood, masonry, light rescue, cribbing	Paramedics	Low Angle
3	Physical	Hand tools	First aid	None

The opportunities to mix teams on the same task were often hampered by the type of equipment they had or the techniques they employed. The hand-held radios operated on different frequencies or the wire communications and sensing systems used by the teams were integrated into a single control box. The tools ranged from basic axes, shovels, and sledge hammers to sophisticated air hammers and cutting tools operated from portable generators and air compressors. The teams, with widely varying levels of experience, also used different techniques, and the AVRİK categorization of their capabilities is shown in Table 5. This matrix was used to ensure the tasks assigned to the teams were within their capabilities. Each team, however, was able to assist the Icelandic teams or to work alongside other NATO teams to achieve the common purpose, and they did these tasks well. Some items of equipment, such as connectors on oxygen tanks,

were not interoperable with military or commercial systems available in Iceland, and this made it difficult to replenish the tanks.

**Table 5. Level of Capabilities of National SAR Teams**

Nation	Number of Teams	Capabilities					Total Personnel
		Overall	Search	Rescue	Medical	Rope	
Austria	2	1	1	1	1	1	34
Estonia	2	2	3	1/2	2	2/3	26
Lithuania	1	2	3	1	2	2	21
Romania	2	1/2	2	1/2	1	1/2	23
Russia	1	1	1	1	1	1	10
Ukraine	1	2	3	1	3	1	10

### **(3) Overall Performance of the CJTF Staff and Field Units**

The CJTF staff, ground, air, and maritime units performed well during the LIVEX events.

**(a) Importance of CPX and STX to the Success of CFX** – The CPX and STX periods of scheduled training were essential training periods that provided the combined and joint staff composed of both NATO member and partner personnel with a necessary understanding of their duties and responsibilities. During the CPX, several shortfalls were noted in the physical layouts of the JCP and EOC, the amount of telephone and facsimile equipment provided, computer support that was available, and the procedures for transmitting and receiving information. These shortfalls were corrected after the CPX and both facilities were fully operational for the STX phase when they were again put into use and given minor adjustments before the CFX.

The STX period enabled the aircrews to acquire familiarity with local air traffic control procedures, to conduct reconnaissance of the exercise landing zones, and to train field teams on proper helicopter loading procedures and safety of flight information prior to the CFX. The ground crews were provided the opportunity to exercise their equipment and both observe and practice techniques with the other teams before deploying to the field sites.

By the end of the STX, the CJTF staff and teams were familiar with the procedures and operations they would be expected to perform. If these training periods had not been scheduled, the exercise could not have accomplished all of its objectives

and many teams would have experienced delays and fewer opportunities for training. When combined and joint elements of staff headquarters and field units are expected to work together during an exercise, they benefit from the experience of the CPX and STX.

**(b) Safety** – Safety was a major concern throughout the exercise. There were many opportunities for accidents.

The helicopters were flown throughout the 24-hour exercise day without mishap. The partner helicopters, however, had no onboard transponders or navigational radios because they are trained to operate in a ground controlled environment and to make radar controlled instrument approaches. The partners should be encouraged to acquire appropriate radio equipment to improve safety and interoperability with NATO member forces.

Simulated victims were inserted into complex rubble sites often under concrete or other debris, were cut out of the sites using power tools, and then were evacuated by helicopter, truck, or boat to medical facilities. The victims were mostly high school volunteers, but the range extended from 3 to 90 years of age. They often had to occupy positions in cold, damp, and dark locations at the sites for several hours while waiting to be extricated. At some sites, they were able to take breaks while the teams continued, but configurations at other sites made this impossible.

Some of the partner field teams operated equipment without appropriate goggles, gloves, or other safety protection equipment such as ear plugs. Also, personnel accountability of team members at these sites was not practiced or enforced while the teams worked on the difficult sites. Teams often worked without scheduled breaks and after several hours of manual labor, fatigue was evident, and this could have resulted in accidents.

Triage was performed on patients once they were removed from the structure at the site, but was not performed while the patients were still stuck in the structure. Little medical attention was given patients between their removal from the structure and arrival at the triage point at the site. Additional medical training for many of the teams would be useful to expose them to patient documentation, medical equipment that is likely to be available at the sites or while patients are being evacuated, and how to treat victims suffering from crush syndrome.

**(c) Need for Host Nation Liaison with the CJTF** – There were a number of questions concerning the Icelandic geography, environment, and response capabilities at the CJTF headquarters during the CFX. There was no AVRIK liaison officer assigned to

the CJTF headquarters during the first day of the exercise and these questions required extensive use of various available communications means to resolve, and resulted in delays in many staff actions. A host nation liaison officer was assigned starting on the second day, and these questions were then resolved within the CJTF quickly, and indicate the importance of the host nation liaison to the CJTF headquarters.

**(d) Enforcement of Duty Cycles and Tasking Authority** – The response teams were sometimes tasked late in the scheduled duty cycle. When this occurred, the teams continued to work to finish the job rather than request relief by another team. This caused the team to work beyond its scheduled duty cycle, arrive late for feeding, and reduce its rest period. The CJTF headquarters should anticipate this problem and enforce the duty cycle to conserve the resources of its force, particularly during extended operations.

At other times, when the team finished a task, they were given another task by an authority in the field, either the incident commander or the regional CDC. The teams cooperated in responding to perform the new task, but this action meant they could not be assigned additional tasks by the CJTF during that duty cycle. This situation was caused by two factors: (1) the goal of keeping all teams busy during the exercise to maximize their training opportunity, and (2) the lack of clarification in command relationships between the CJTF elements and the host nation authorities at the disaster sites. While the first factor should be a goal of subsequent exercises, there is also a need to clarify the command arrangements between the host nation authorities and the CJTF military and paramilitary organizations that respond.

**(e) Long Tasking Chain** – This exercise was ambitious and unprecedented, and was designed in part to ensure the capabilities of PfP/NATO participants were well employed. Several artificialities were accepted to ensure exercise success, regarding both the initiation of the disaster and the response. For example, the pre-deployment decision process was compressed so that the CJTF was established and the participants were all in country when the CFX commenced, within hours of the simulated earthquake. Generally, the events were tailored to the capabilities of the PfP teams. The GOI, or any nation, might well elect to request assistance bilaterally from other nations in parallel with -- or in lieu of -- requests to NATO or the UN.

The exercise followed the procedures established during the preliminary conferences and plan development. The tasking chain during the CFX for processing requests for assistance involved the GOI (AVRIK), the UN, and the CJTF in the

decision-making process. The host nation incident commanders requested assistance from their regional Civil Defense Center (CDC) when the situation exceeded the capabilities at the site. The CDC either allocated capabilities from elsewhere in its area or passed the request by facsimile to the EOC. When the EOC received the request, it could reassign Icelandic capabilities from other CDCs to the site or request outside assistance through the United Nations OSOCC established for this exercise. When requested, the OSOCC coordinated among available international assistance providers to determine which team or teams would provide the assistance. If assistance from a PFP team was required, the OSOCC would provide that requirement to the CIMIC cell at the EOC, and the CIMIC cell would relay the requirement to the CJTF. The CJTF would decide which team to task and would then pass that requirement on to the LRC to alert and dispatch the designated team. There were some time delays in the chain both in the delivery of the requirement to the CJTF and within the CJTF organization.

During a large scale disaster when lives are at risk, this time must be shortened if the mission is to be accomplished successfully. In these situations, it is likely that at least some of the international relief resources could be allocated directly to support the most severely affected CDCs based on the joint needs assessment. This allocation of resources should occur in an actual contingency because it would reduce the lengthy decision process and enable the assistance to be provided in a more responsive manner. On the other hand, such an arrangement would require the forward deployment and transfer of authority of some of the military teams to the CDC. The CJTF would need to develop an intermediate echelon of command for the multinational resources allocated to the CDC and provide life support for and sustain the forward deployed forces unless they were self-sufficient. Another option that might reduce the tasking time would be to split the CJTF headquarters, with some or all of the J-3 section collocated with the CIMIC cell in the EOC as a forward element of the CJTF, and with the J-4 and other sections comprising the CJTF Rear at the JCP. There are other options which could be considered such as transferring authority of all teams to the GOI and using the CJTF to perform logistics functions and coordinate the operations of the helicopters; another option could be to collocate the LRC and JCP.

**(f) Special Command Arrangement for Russian Elements** – The Russian forces participating in the exercise were granted special command arrangements. The commander of the Russian troops was also one of two Deputy Commanders of the CJTF in the exercise operation order, but in reality was deployed in the field with his troops

throughout the exercise. These special arrangements had no measurable influence on command and control during the exercise.

**(g) Transportation for CJTF Field Units** – Many of the field units had no organic surface transportation. This shortfall was filled by vehicles and drivers provided from units assigned to NAS Keflavik not otherwise participating in the exercise or by commercial contract. In actual contingencies, it is unlikely that the CJTF will deploy either to an existing military facility where vehicles and drivers can be provided, or to a location where vehicles from host nation resources can be made available during the emergency. The participating SAR and medical teams should deploy with an organic surface transportation capability, or the CJTF should include transportation elements to support the teams so they do not become a burden on the host nation once they arrive.

**(h) Movement Control of CJTF Assets** – Positive control of movements was exercised during the CFX. The CJTF headquarters at the JCP, the Air Operations Cell at the airfield, and the LRC at the high school coordinated the movements from origin to destinations using cellular phones for surface movements or helicopter radios for air movements.

**(i) Daily Personnel Status Reporting** – When the participating forces arrived, they were entered into the CJTF personnel system at the JRC. Commanders of national contingents were required to provide daily personnel status reports to the J1 for all members from the nation. In some cases, no reports were received while in other cases individual team leaders reported the status of their members. The reporting requirements in the operation order and verbal instructions provided to the commanders apparently confused some of the participants.

#### **4. Other Exercise Support Operations**

Three additional support operations – the public information program, the distinguished visitor program, and the Joint Reception Center – were important to the success of the exercise. The activities are described in the paragraphs that follow.

##### **a. Public Information**

The public information program was an active part of the exercise. A Press Information Center (PIC) staffed by ACLANT, USACOM, and member and partner representatives was established at the Junior College facilities in Reykjavik prior to the arrival of the deploying forces. The PIC was continuously manned each day throughout

the exercise period. It coordinated press coverage of the key exercise events with the local media and assisted other media teams deployed for the exercise by each of the partner nations participating in the exercise. The NATO press office brought their own media crews, and coverage was also provided by the Department of Defense public affairs office and a Norfolk, Virginia area television crew. Overall, the press coverage was positive and supported the goals and objectives of the exercise. The proactive coverage was successful in disarming anticipated local objections to NATO (and Eastern European partner) activities occurring in Iceland which did not materialize during the exercise. The local press provided daily television and newspaper coverage of the major exercise events, and the opening ceremony with the equipment displays confirmed to even the most skeptical that the exercise was humanitarian in nature and intended to assist the GOI and its population during a high probability disaster scenario.

**b. Distinguished Visitor Program**

General John J. Sheehan, SACLANT and CINCUSACOM, hosted the distinguished visitors (DVs) group of 39 senior military and civilian officials representing the NATO member and partner nations. The DV program was focused on observing key exercise events scheduled on Friday and Saturday 25 and 26 July. Their visits included observation of activities at major SAR sites and the medical treatment sites. They also visited the EOC and the JCP to observe the operation of staffs at these locations. A number of social events were also scheduled during the evenings by the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, the American Ambassador to Iceland, and General Sheehan. A luncheon for the DVs on the glacier followed by a snow-mobile ride was also hosted by the GOI on 26 July.

**c. Joint Reception Center Operation**

The JRC was established in the air terminal at Keflavik NAS to facilitate the reception and processing of arriving personnel, and to assist them with their outprocessing at the conclusion of the exercise, including Icelandic customs requirements. The center was operated efficiently and processed the arriving and departing NATO personnel. The briefings and printed material prepared and distributed by the JRC were designed to familiarize the personnel rapidly with the local area and answer many questions that they might have.

## **G. PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This exercise was not only conducted successfully, but also established a number of favorable precedents for NATO. While accomplishing its six main objectives, the extensive planning activities and the efforts of the civilian and military participants during the exercise also established a positive momentum that should be exploited and refined in subsequent NATO PfP exercises focused on humanitarian assistance.

Several exercise options should be considered based on these efforts. First, a similar exercise, including the CPX and LIVEX, could be scheduled in Iceland on a biennial basis during years when Exercise Northern Viking is not scheduled, subject to the concurrence of the GOI. Alternatively, the CPX and LIVEX events could be scheduled in Iceland during different years to provide a longer training cycle for the participants. Finally, the same exercise might be held at some other location where strategic transportation costs could be reduced and a greater number of teams and other supporting units could participate.

Several observations that should be considered in subsequent exercises have been identified in this section. They are grouped into five general categories: (1) command, control, and communications; (2) information management; (3) logistics; (4) exercise planning; and (5) administrative operations. Within each category, the observation is identified followed by a short summary discussion and specific recommendations.

### **1. Command, Control, and Communications**

#### **a. Transfer of Authority over NATO Member and Partner Forces**

**Observation:** There was no formal transfer of authority for participating forces from national authorities to the designated NATO Commander of the CJTF.

**Discussion:** The partner and member nations deployed to the exercise in accordance with detailed plans developed during the various exercise planning conferences. Once the forces arrived in Iceland, however, there was no formal transfer of authority (TOA) – Operational Control (OPCON) of the member or partner elements participating in the exercise – from national authority to the NATO Commander of the CJTF. The NATO commander and CJTF staff essentially had no authority to task participants, to require them to comply with safety of flight rules, or to take appropriate action to remediate situations between one national participant and the GOI or other national delegations. The participants did work cooperatively during this exercise to



ensure that problems were resolved and that exercise objectives were met. In future exercises, the NATO transfer of authority procedures should be practiced so that the CJTF commander is provided OPCON over the forces during the period of time that they participate in the exercise as would a NATO commander during an actual contingency operation. Because the NATO TOA procedures apply to military units, the procedures for TOA should be reviewed and, if necessary, expanded to cover paramilitary and civilian units in this type of operation.

**Recommendation:** *Exercise planners should incorporate the established NATO TOA process into both the deployment and redeployment phases of all exercises so that national authorities and exercise CJTF commanders and staffs become familiar with these procedures and employ them when contingency operations occur. NATO should clarify applicability of TOA process to paramilitary and civilian organizations that are likely to operate within a CJTF during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief contingency operations.*

**b. Status of Forces Participating in the Exercise**

**Observation:** The status of NATO member and partner forces participating in the exercise was established by separate memorandum of agreement between the GOI and SACLANT rather than through the normal NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) process.

**Discussion:** Most NATO members and many of the partner nations have concluded bilateral SOFAs that clarify the status of national personnel when operating in or transiting the host nation. The GOI has instead covered the status of U.S. forces in a bilateral agreement with the USG. The status of member and partner troops who participated in the exercise had to be clarified prior to the exercise. This was accomplished by concluding a memorandum of agreement between the NATO commander scheduling the exercise, SACLANT, and the GOI. This agreement is applicable only to Cooperative Safeguard and granted the participants the same status as that afforded to U.S. military personnel. If the GOI implemented the NATO SOFA with member and partner nations, such a special agreement would not be required whenever a NATO exercise is conducted in Iceland and the status of transiting personnel would be clarified.

**Recommendation:** *The GOI should be encouraged to conclude SOFAs with the NATO member and partner nations to simplify administrative processing of the forces during future exercises held in Iceland or while the forces are transiting Iceland under NATO auspices.*

### c. Coordination of Deploying Forces

**Observation:** The NATO Bi-MNC Allied Mobility Coordination Center located in Mons, Belgium had no role during the exercise.

**Discussion:** The Allied Mobility Coordination Center (AMCC) was established to coordinate the deployment and redeployment of NATO forces across national boundaries. The cell was used successfully during Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard to coordinate the movement of member, partner, and other allied forces into and out of the operational area. This exercise, requiring the movement of member and partner resources from various locations in Allied Command Europe's area of responsibility into Allied Command Atlantic's area of responsibility, would have provided the AMCC with an excellent training opportunity to establish contacts with appropriate participating national authorities and gain experience in coordinating movements of both individual personnel for the planning conferences and forces during the deployment and redeployment phases of the exercise. Instead, these tasks were additional requirements placed on the exercise planning staff.

**Recommendation:** *The AMCC should be an active participant in planning conferences and during the deployment and redeployment phases of Partnership for Peace exercises that involve the movement of personnel and forces across international boundaries.*

### d. Lengthy Tasking Chain

**Observation:** During the CFX, some time delays occurred in processing requests for assistance.

**Discussion:** All tasking for the CJTF resources originated with requests from the host nation. Before international assistance was requested, AVRIK procedures first ensured that the needed capability could not be provided from Icelandic resources available to other CDCs. The EOC request for non-Icelandic assistance was then passed in this exercise through the UN OSOCC. The OSOCC coordinated the international response and, when NATO/PfP resources were required, passed the requirement to the CIMIC cell in the EOC. The CIMIC cell then passed the request to the CJTF and the CJTF initiated its internal procedures. Generally, this tasking process worked well in the exercise, but there were some time delays both within the CJTF process and prior to the request reaching the CJTF. Several options to shorten the response time that might be considered include assigning TACON of some of the NATO and PfP field and support forces to a regional CDC, or even to a local incident commander in a more devastated

area; splitting the CJTF headquarters into forward and rear echelons; transferring authority of all teams to the GOI with the CJTF providing support functions and controlling the helicopters; and collocating the LRC with the JCP.

***Recommendation:** Subsequent exercises should explore and evaluate alternative arrangements to make the tasking during exercise and actual events more responsive to the needs of the affected population.*

**e. Common Language**

**Observation:** Not all partner participants met the level of English language capabilities specified in the exercise operations order.

**Discussion:** This PFP exercise was an extremely complex event. It formed a combined and joint staff that integrated partner and member nation personnel into a CJTF headquarters. These personnel were required to send and receive messages by telephone, facsimile machine or computer, post status boards, and converse with other staff members in the English language while complying with NATO procedures. The team leaders were required to converse in English when they reported their movements and provided status reports by telephone, and received briefings from the host nation incident commanders and asked essential questions to ensure the safety of their team members and the victims at the dangerous work sites. Helicopter crews were required to follow instructions in English both from local air traffic controllers and host nation civil aviation authorities, and to comply with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) published procedures. In addition, it was necessary for NATO participants to interact at many levels with the host nation participants using English, although it was a second or third language for the host nation personnel. It was impractical in this situation to provide translators for each staff officer, team leader, and aviator, although in many cases it was essential that the individuals had a clear understanding of the English message to ensure safety of the teams or personnel aboard the helicopter. Unfortunately, many of the partner participants did not have a firm grasp of English specified in the NATO STANAG and this caused delays in processing information, additional communications to clarify instructions, and close supervision of air operations by the DISTAFF to ensure safety.

***Recommendation:** Partner nations need to emphasize English training for their personnel, especially staff personnel assigned to combined headquarters, leaders of humanitarian assistance teams, and aviators who must communicate with air traffic control authorities.*

**f. Communications Between the CJTF Headquarters and Its Teams**

**Observation:** There was an over-reliance on the host nation telephone system to enable the CJTF to communicate.

**Discussion:** Exercise planners determined in this inaugural exercise not to include communication problems. However, during contingencies where the local infrastructure has been subjected to natural or man-made disasters, it is likely that the host nation telephone system will be disrupted locally or on a nation-wide basis, and that host nation authorities will exercise tight control over any residual capability. For this exercise, many teams deployed with sufficient capability to communicate internally, but they had no capability to communicate with the CJTF headquarters or other elements of the force by radio. The CJTF headquarters did not use radio communication, but instead relied on commercial telephone lines to link computers, to send hard copy facsimiles, and to communicate between headquarters elements. Team leaders were provided cellular phones to report movements and status. NATO exercise and contingency planners should not assume availability of the local telephone system in these situations. In future exercises, the CJTF should deploy with sufficient communications capability to ensure it can communicate with all of its subordinate elements and the host nation authorities by radio until more efficient telephonic communications can be restored. The resources to provide this capability can be furnished by one or more partner nations. Establishing and employing radio communications during the early phase of the exercise will provide additional training opportunities for the participants, and should produce an essential capability for similar contingencies.

**Recommendation:** *One or more of the partner nations should be tasked in future exercises to provide the CJTF with necessary communications capabilities to enable the command to operate without reliance on the host nation telephone system either during exercises or contingency operations.*

**g. Communications at Helicopter Landing Zones**

**Observation:** There were no radio communications available at the designated helicopter landing zones.

**Discussion:** Communication between ground crews and helicopters at landing zones was accomplished using smoke and hand signals. At one medical evacuation site, the landing zone was in a factory parking lot surrounded by trees and a berm. A number of medical evacuation missions were flown into and out of the site and the Distinguished

Visitors also flew to the site during the exercise. Because of the heavy traffic and small landing and parking area available, the U.S. controller assigned to the site was unable to advise the crews of flight safety conditions or to exercise positive control over the helicopters using the facility. At other locations, ground crews signaled helicopters using smoke and then attempted to land the helicopters downwind rather than into the wind. The crews observed the smoke direction and landed into the wind negating the utility of the ground controller, but did conduct safe flight operations.

**Recommendation:** *During exercises and contingencies where helicopters are employed, two-way radio communications capabilities should be provided to ground controllers at sites where heavy helicopter activity is anticipated, such as medical treatment facilities. All ground controllers should be made aware of potential obstacles and wind conditions that could present hazards to flight operations and guide the helicopters to safe landings.*

#### **h. Host Nation Liaison at the CJTF Headquarters**

**Observation:** There is a requirement for full-time host nation liaison within the CJTF headquarters.

**Discussion:** The CJTF deployed its CIMIC team to the host nation EOC to serve as its liaison and technical advisor to both local officials and representatives of the United Nations operating the OSOCC at the same location. The host nation, however, did not initially deploy a liaison to the CJTF headquarters. Many questions and coordination issues occurred at the CJTF headquarters during the first day of the exercise which could have been resolved quickly by a host nation liaison officer located at the headquarters, but instead, they had to be passed to the CIMIC team located at the EOC for resolution. This action created an additional communications workload and caused delays in resolving the problems. A host nation liaison officer was assigned to the CJTF headquarters beginning on the second day of the exercise and this resulted in the timely resolution of a number of issues without adding to the communications workload.

**Recommendation:** *During exercises and contingencies, the CJTF should request full-time liaison support for its headquarters from the host nation.*

**i. Maintaining the Duty Cycles for CJTF Teams and Clarification of Tasking Authority**

**Observation:** The duty cycles for some of the teams were exceeded and there was confusion regarding the tasking authority of the incident commanders.

**Discussion:** The personnel performing the SAR and medical tasks were assigned to day or night shifts of 12 hours. Team leaders were required to provide to the CJTF headquarters status reports 30 minutes after arrival at a site, every three hours while working the site, and when the task was completed. In some cases, the teams received tasking late in their duty cycle and continued to work past their normal shift to complete the task. These actions caused the teams to miss scheduled rest periods which could reduce their capabilities during prolonged operations. The CJTF headquarters should closely monitor the status of its deployed teams and ensure they adhere to the duty cycle and are replaced when required. In other cases, when the task was completed before the shift change, the team was reassigned to another task by the incident or regional civil defense commander. Because the existing NATO procedures for transferring authority were not implemented, the authority of these commanders was not clearly established.

**Recommendation:** *The CJTF headquarters should enforce duty cycles for its teams, forecast and deploy replacement teams when required, and ensure that tasking authority of civil defense commanders in the field is in accordance with established NATO procedures.*

**j. Employing CIMIC Teams at all Operational Areas**

**Observation:** The only CIMIC team deployed outside of the CJTF headquarters was the cell assigned to the EOC/OSOCC, but other locations also will require these teams during contingency operations.

**Discussion:** During this exercise, the CIMIC team deployed to the EOC/OSOCC served as the CJTF's liaison with both host nation and the United Nations authorities and served as technical advisor on the capabilities of the military resources for these authorities. During humanitarian relief contingencies, it may be equally important to have CIMIC teams assigned to host nation regional headquarters in a liaison role to facilitate employment of military resources in those areas. In addition, CIMIC cells may be required for coordination at other key host nation locations. For example, in this exercise, the IDF provided a liaison cell to the Icelandic Civil Aviation Administration, but in other countries where there is no U.S. or NATO command present, the CIMIC

teams will be required to provide all CJTF liaison with critical host nation organizations such as the civil aviation authorities.

**Recommendation:** *During exercises, CIMIC teams should be employed at regional host nation civil defense headquarters to facilitate use of military resources at these locations and in a liaison role at other key host nation locations to coordinate CJTF activities with these agencies.*

#### **k. Sharing of CJTF Experience**

**Observation:** The experience gained in the stand-up of the CJTF for CS-97 should be disseminated to all those concerned with developing CJTF concepts in NATO.

**Discussion:** NATO is in the process of developing concepts for the use of CJTFs and will be conducting exercises in which a CJTF is the command authority for the operation. The CJTF for this exercise developed a wealth of experience in organizing the headquarters, manning the billets with international personnel from several member and partner nations, and directing the operations of a multinational force during disaster relief operations supporting the civilian organizations of a NATO member nation.

**Recommendation:** *A detailed description of the process used to organize and operate the exercise CJTF should be provided at any early date to those commands involved in the preparations for CJTF exercises and operations within ACE and ACLANT.*

### **2. Information Management**

#### **a. Accurate Descriptions of CJTF Resource Capabilities and Requirements**

**Observation:** Information on the capabilities of the member and partner teams and equipment, and their resupply and transportation requirements were not clearly identified.

**Discussion:** The size, composition, and capabilities of the various national teams and their equipment vary greatly. These capabilities must be described in sufficient detail for the CJTF headquarters so that appropriate resources can be assigned to tasks. Organizations such as the International Search and Rescue Group (INSARG) are developing standards for these response units and this type of information should be used by NATO. Additionally, information on team requirements for resupply and surface or helicopter transportation to the work sites were not clearly described and this caused delays and last minute adjustments in capabilities or transportation resources.

**Recommendation:** *The NATO Military Agency for Standardization should develop standard reporting formats that describe in detail the characteristics of the member and partner national disaster assistance teams in terms that are accepted and used throughout the international humanitarian relief community so CJTF headquarters can employ these resources effectively. The formats should also describe the resupply and surface and helicopter transportation requirements for these teams so that the information can be used by the CJTF to support them during contingency operations.*

**b. Humanitarian Relief Information Availability**

**Observation:** The CJTF and the IDF staff that conducted the exercise did not have a single authoritative source of information to support humanitarian relief planning and execution.

**Discussion:** During the planning and execution of the exercise, the IDF staff and the CJTF staff that was created for the exercise were unable to identify from a single source all of the type of data and information it needed to conduct humanitarian relief operations. There are many sources of this information that includes military doctrinal publications; United Nations handbooks, policies and procedures, and service packaging concepts; an OFDA handbook; team capabilities and requirements; equipment characteristics such as helicopter and truck capacities and operating characteristics, helicopter safe entry and exit locations, and fuel and special resupply requirements. Most of this information is available at various locations on the World Wide Web, but is not organized and displayed in a manner that will assist the staffs of military organizations during contingency operations.

**Recommendation:** *U.S. Atlantic Command should propose to the Joint Staff (J-4) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements) that available humanitarian relief information be organized and incorporated into a Web Page on the Non-Secure IP Routed Network for use by all combatant commands and their components to plan and execute these contingencies.*

**c. Common Picture of CJTF Resource Tasking**

**Observation:** A common picture of CJTF resources must be available at the CJTF headquarters and at the CIMIC Cell.

**Discussion:** As a result of the experience during the CPX, a spreadsheet was designed to depict the current status of resources assigned to the CJTF. A sample of this spreadsheet, shown as Figure 2, was used within the CJTF headquarters and a similar



TEAM		KHS	REQUEST TIME	MISSION NUMBER	REMARKS	ETA	ATA	COMPLETION TIME	KHS ETA
MED 01	Estonian	3	250730Z	1.0.2	N6357 W2226 OPS FROM 251100Z	251045Z	251035Z	ENDEX	Ready
MED 02+ 03	Latvian (T)	3	250730Z	2.0.2	N6408 W2147 OPS FROM 251220Z	251000Z	251020Z	ENDEX	2 Reconstitution
MED 04	NAS Hosp	5	261303Z	1.2.3	GRINDAVIK				3 Mission
MED 05	Russian Hosp	3		3.0.2	OPS FROM 251240Z	251025Z	251025Z	ENDEX	4 Not available
SAR 01	Austrian A	5			RESTING UNTIL 1500				5 Resting
SAR 02	Austrian B	5			resting until 270700				
SAR 04	Estonian A	5			resting until 270700				
SAR 05	Estonian B	3	270350Z	2.4.1.	SELTJARNARNES	270530Z			
SAR 06	Lithuanian	5			resting until 270700				
SAR 07	Romanian A	5			resting until 270700				
SAR 08	Romanian B	3	270358Z	2.4.2.	SELTJARNARNES	270500Z			
SAR 09	Russia	5			resting until 270700				
SAR 10	Ukraine	2						270320	270630 EST
RAVEN 54	UH-60	5							
RAVEN 12	UH-60	4			NMC AS OF 261215Z				
RAVEN 85	UH-60	5							
JOLLY 06	HH-60	1							
JOLLY 08	HH-60	1							
NOMAD 33	CH-47	1							
NOMAD 49	CH-47	5							
NOMAD 52	CH-47	5							
NOMAD 08	MI-8	5							
BRAVE 41	Lynx	5							
NOMAD 14	BO-105	5							
ANDENES	NOCGV	2							

Figure 2. CJTF Resource Spreadsheet

chart was supposed to be maintained current – at three hour intervals – in the CIMIC Cell. The common picture would provide the CIMIC Cell with essential information to ensure it did not accept tasks that the CJTF could not execute during coordination sessions with the OSOCC, and enable the CJTF headquarters to monitor the status and location of its teams. Similar information should be available to the LRC, the Air Operations Cell, and any intermediate headquarters established by the CJTF. At the conclusion of the exercise, the spreadsheet shown as Figure 3 was developed to display the historical record of SAR team activity. This historical record should be developed for all teams and integrated into the daily CJTF briefing summaries because it provides a useful tool for the CJTF headquarters to balance workloads and ensure teams adhere to duty cycles.

***Recommendation:** During future exercises and contingency operations the CJTF headquarters should maintain a common picture of its resource tasking with the CIMIC Cell and other headquarters locations established by the CJTF, and develop daily historical summaries of activities for all teams so that it can better manage its assigned resources.*

#### **d. Use of Host Nation Drivers to Escort Teams**

**Observation:** Host nation drivers were used to escort teams to disaster sites, but some drivers were not familiar with the areas where the sites were located.

**Discussion:** A number of host nation drivers were furnished to ensure the teams would be able to locate the assigned work sites. This arrangement worked well for most sites, but in some situations, the drivers were not familiar with the local area and could not find the exercise site. In these situations, it was necessary for the DISTAFF to prompt the host nation drivers so the team could find the site and minimize the waiting time for the personnel operating the site and the response teams. During actual emergencies similar problems are likely to be encountered, but there will not be a DISTAFF to resolve the difficulty and procedures should attempt to minimize these problems.

***Recommendation:** The CJTF should request the host nation tasking messages include a clear and accurate description of the site, standard procedures for locating it and the incident commander, and the communications frequencies used by both the incident commander and the regional Civil Defense Center.*

			25-Jul				28-Jul				27-Jul			1	2	3	4	5	Ready
	8:00	12:00	16:00	20:00	0:00	4:00	8:00	12:00	16:00	20:00	0:00	4:00	8:00	12:00	16:00	20:00	0:00	4:00	8:00
Austrian	1	1	15:11-19:00	5	5	03:25-08:25	5	13:15	5	20:34-23:03	23:03-04:12	1	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Austrian B	5	5	1.11	21:00	22:45-03:59	2	2	13:15-15:22	5	2.2.1	2.3.1	5	8:45	3	3	3	3	3	3
Estonian A	1	13:29-15:30	1	19:00-23:59	5	5	2	2.5.1/1.1.3	5	10:45	5	5	9:00	3	3	3	3	3	3
Estonian B	5	2.1.2	5	2.2.2	1	1.1.3	5	1.1.3	5	21:00	1.3.4	7:00	3.3.2	5	5	5	5	5	5
Lithuanian	1	12:26	3	23:59	0:15	2.5.1	5	15:59	5	1.3.2	5	7:09	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Romanian A	1	2.5.1	3	23:59	2.5.1	5	2.3.2	3	17:00	5	5	3.3.3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Romanian B	5	12:26	5	22:48	3	2.4.1	8:45	5	20:13	20:13	0:21	7:30	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Russia	10:00-10:30	14:00	1	2.4.1	1.2.1	5	5	14:35	23:59	23:59	2.4.2	7:04	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Ukraine	3.0.2	5	5	21:00	0:22	8:30	5	1.2.3	5	20:40	3.3.6	7:00	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
					2.1.4														

Figure 3. Historical Summary of SAR Team Activities

**e. Information Describing the Host Nation Response Capabilities**

**Observation:** The AVRIK focus was to provide the exercise participants with information on how its EOC was organized and how tasking would be passed to the CJTF headquarters, not on the organizations, responsibilities, and capabilities of the regional and local organizations with which the response teams would operate.

**Discussion:** The principal focus of the AVRIK information provided to the CJTF was how its headquarters was organized and the procedures to be used when the CJTF was requested to support the host nation. The response teams had little information on how the host nation was organized below the EOC echelon or what capabilities local Icelandic rescue teams would have when the NATO teams arrived at the sites. This information would have enabled the NATO team leaders to understand better what their role was and how they might better complement the efforts of the host nation teams and regional organizations.

**Recommendation:** *The host nation should provide NATO exercise participants with a complete picture of their response organization and capabilities so the deploying teams will understand how they will interface with these organizations in the field.*

**f. Incomplete Mission Tasking**

**Observation:** A number of tasks were received by the CJTF headquarters from the CIMIC Cell at the EOC that had incomplete information.

**Discussion:** A number of tasks were accepted by the CIMIC Cell that had incomplete tasking information. Points of contact, phone numbers, and location addresses or names were frequently missing. This information was needed to brief the team leader prior to departure. Because the information was essential, it had to be obtained from the EOC and this caused delays in providing resources.

**Recommendation:** *The CIMIC Cell should ensure that the host nation provides all information needed by the CJTF teams before the tasking message is sent to the headquarters.*

**3. Logistics Support**

**a. Transportation for the CJTF Units**

**Observation:** The SAR and medical teams required surface transportation during the exercise and this was provided from resources

available at Keflavik Naval Air Station that were not otherwise participating in the exercise, or from contracted support.

**Discussion:** This exercise was atypical in that the force deployed to an operational U.S. military facility. Original intentions were to move the teams to exercise sites on contract buses, but this proved to be too expensive. Accordingly, surface transportation using vans was furnished on an *ad hoc* basis from available military organizations at the base and from contracts prearranged with commercial firms. Military drivers were drawn from base units to operate the military vehicles supporting the exercise and civilian drivers from the commercial firms. For most out-of-area humanitarian relief contingencies, the CJTF would not have access to locally available military vehicles and the available host nation resources would likely be used by local officials to support their assistance needs. The deploying teams should have adequate surface transportation to meet their own needs, or one or more partner nation should be tasked to provide transportation for the entire CJTF. In addition, when NATO teams were delivered to sites by helicopter, the helicopter landing zones were not always close to the site, and the teams required local transport to move their personnel and equipment to the work location. These transportation arrangements should be coordinated in advance to minimize the enroute delays for the teams.

**Recommendation:** *Teams should deploy for humanitarian relief exercises and actual contingencies with sufficient organic surface transportation, or one or more partner nations should provide transportation to support the requirements of the entire CJTF. When deploying teams by helicopter, a system needs to be in place to coordinate local transportation between the helicopter landing zone and the work site prior to the arrival of the team.*

#### **b. Movement Control of CJTF Assets**

**Observation:** The movement control of CJTF assets worked well during the exercise.

**Discussion:** The CJTF required team leaders traveling to sites by surface transportation to provide three movement reports by cellular phone. The reports were made to the movement control team established in the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) at Keflavik High School. Team leaders were required to report telephonically: (1) team departure from the staging area at the high school, (2) team arrival at the destination site, and (3) team departure from the site on completion of the mission. Team leaders provided a mission debrief to the LRC when they returned to the staging area, and this

briefing enabled the LRC to close out the movement control of the team. Elements transported to the sites by helicopter also reported departure from the staging area, but Icelandic civil aviation authorities exercised control over the flights into and out of the sites using radar and on board transponders when they were available. The air tracking system, however, could not identify which team was aboard a given aircraft without looking at the aircraft manifest. This reporting system allowed the CJTF to exercise positive control over the movement of all teams during the exercise.

**Recommendation:** *Planners and CJTF headquarters should establish similar procedures to ensure positive movement control of teams deploying by surface or air during humanitarian relief exercises and contingency operations.*

#### **c. Feeding CJTF Teams**

**Observation:** The feeding schedule during the exercise did not always match the needs of the participants.

**Discussion:** The meals for the exercise were provided by a contracted commercial caterer. Hot meals were served for two meals per day (breakfast and dinner) and box lunches were provided for the mid-shift meal. The exercise was conducted on a 24-hour basis with teams assigned to either a day or night shift. The shift changes were planned so that all teams would have hot meals at KHS and carry box lunches to the work sites. The teams were employed in manually intensive labor digging through rubble sites, breaking concrete, lifting and removing rubble from victims, and evacuating patients from the sites. Meals should take into account the heavy work the teams perform. In addition, the teams often received their tasking later than planned, and once on site, they were sometimes held past the normal shift period. These actions caused some of the teams to miss the window when the caterer was serving and special arrangements had to be made to provide the teams with hot meals. Similar situations are likely to be encountered during contingency operations and the content, method, and schedule for feeding the CJTF should take into account alternatives that accommodate the unique requirements of the teams.

**Recommendation:** *The content, method, and schedule for feeding the CJTF teams should be carefully selected during exercises and contingencies to minimize the administrative burdens on the teams and to ensure that personnel are fed sufficient rations when and where their tasks take them.*

#### **d. Daily Personnel Status Reporting**

**Observation:** The heads of national delegations were required to make daily personnel status reports to the CJTF J-1, but many did not.

**Discussion:** The exercise operation order listed all reports that were to be provided during the exercise in Annex R. One of the required reports was a daily personnel status report. This report was to be made by the head of each national delegation to the CJTF J-1 for all members of the delegation. In some cases, no report was provided and in other cases reports were received from team leaders for the members of their team, not the entire national delegation.

**Recommendation:** *The personnel status report requirement should be discussed and clarified by a J-1 representative with each national delegation head at the conclusion of the JRC in-processing session. Sufficient forms should be provided to the delegation chief who should also be told where and when the form is to be delivered.*

#### **4. Exercise Planning**

##### **a. Importance of Joint Needs Assessment**

**Observation:** The objectives of the exercise and the response during an actual contingency are different and exercise participants should understand them and the importance of the joint needs assessment.

**Discussion:** During a major contingency requiring international humanitarian assistance, the response will be coordinated and furnished by the international community based on the results of a joint needs assessment. The needs of the host nation will determine the size, composition, and timing of the response, including the structure of the military-led CJTF that might be required. The exercise, on the other hand, was constructed to meet the training objectives of the participants, not the needs of the host nation. The staff officers assigned to the CJTF headquarters and commanders of field units need to be made aware of the differences in exercise and contingency force requirements and the importance of the joint assessment process.

**Recommendation:** *Exercise planners should include a seminar for staff officers and field commanders of CJTF forces to be deployed for humanitarian assistance exercises. The seminar should familiarize them with the procedures to be employed during an actual contingency and contrast the differences between exercise and contingency force requirements. The seminar should provide a thorough explanation of which organization should conduct the joint assessment, what the*

*assessment is intended to accomplish, and how the assessment will impact on the composition and structure of the CJTF.*

**b. Exercise the IDF Response**

**Observation:** The IDF has an instruction to support the GOI during disasters such as the one encountered in this scenario, but the plan was not evaluated before or during the exercise, nor was it integrated into the NATO CJTF response.

**Discussion:** The IDF is an active military force stationed in Iceland. It has a current disaster response instruction (COMICEDEFOR Instruction 4900.1D Foreign Disaster Relief Plan) and USACOM has published a Functional Plan (2500-96 Humanitarian Assistance and Foreign Disaster Relief Plan) that describe procedures to be implemented when assisting the host nation in the event of a natural disaster. While the IDF is a U.S. joint command, it is the only military command in Iceland and would provide the initial military response during an emergency in accordance with the Functional Plan and instruction. If NATO member or partner nations provided military resources to the GOI during the emergency, as suggested by the exercise scenario, the IDF could serve as the receiving command and control headquarters for these forces. The IDF could transition to the NATO CJTF at some point in the build up of NATO capabilities, but exactly which criteria would be used for making such a decision and how the transition would take place have not been planned. The exercise scenario provides a useful framework for evaluating the IDF instruction and resolving these transition issues

**Recommendation:** *The IDF disaster relief instruction and USACOM's Functional Plan should be evaluated as part of subsequent NATO humanitarian relief exercises held in Iceland, and the IDF headquarters should develop and evaluate its plan to transition from a U.S. joint command to a NATO CJTF.*

**c. Importance of CPX and STX**

**Observation:** The CPX and STX were two essential events that contributed to the overall success of the exercise.

**Discussion:** The CPX and STX phases of the exercise made important contributions to the successful outcome of the entire exercise. These events enabled the *ad hoc* group of multinational staff officers and field teams who had never met before to become familiar with working cooperatively with each other. These events also enabled



them to gain experience with NATO procedures and to acclimate to the environment of Iceland. This early training minimized problems and potential delays during the CFX, and provided maximum training benefits to the participants while they were deployed for the exercise.

**Recommendation:** *Planners of future NATO humanitarian relief exercises should include CPX and STX phases to prepare the multinational staffs and field units for operations during the CFX.*

**d. Increase Exercise Realism**

**Observation:** The exercise scenario did not include more realistic conditions that are likely to occur during an earthquake, and that would make it more difficult for the CJTF to operate in the environment.

**Discussion:** This exercise was well planned and the disaster sites were difficult and challenging to the teams. The environment established by the scenario, however, allowed the CJTF to operate under more favorable conditions than those that would be expected in an actual disaster. For example, the reception airfield and the lines of communication between it and the field sites were undamaged and imposed no problems during reception or employment. The telephone lines and cellular relay stations were undamaged and the CJTF was not required to use radio communications. There were no environmental spills or pollution problems at the NATO POL storage site or other locations in the exercise area. Finally, there was limited and orderly media coverage, with no aggressive and intruding attempts to obtain information at the individual disaster exercise locations. These problems would require the CJTF to divert and deploy other resources, or at least simulate them, and add to the realism and complexity of the tasks the CJTF would be required to address during the exercise.

**Recommendation:** *Planners should increase the realistic conditions that would stress the CJTF and cause it to divert its forces and deploy other resources to handle the situation in the exercise area.*

**e. Scheduling Two Major Exercises Nearly Simultaneously**

**Observation:** Exercise CS-97 and Exercise Northern Viking 97 were scheduled with some overlap and this placed a heavy burden on the IDF staff.

**Discussion:** The scheduling of CS-97 in conjunction with Exercise Northern Viking 97 was done primarily to reduce transportation costs for the U.S. Army helicopters employed in both exercises. The workload of planning two major exercises –

including deployment, employment, and redeployment of two different tactical forces during a thirty day period – caused the exercise planners to spread their limited resources thinly to accomplish both tasks and carry out their other assigned duties. Because CS-97 occurred first and was a politically important exercise, it received their priority attention and the event was successful. If these exercises were scheduled in alternate years, the staff would be able to devote more attention to each exercise. Separation of the two exercises also would help to de-link the two, since they have significantly different objectives.

***Recommendation:*** *Exercises Northern Viking and Cooperative Safeguard should be scheduled during alternate years to allow the planners adequate time to prepare each exercise.*

#### **f. Safety During Humanitarian Relief Exercises**

**Observation:** The nature of humanitarian relief exercises provides many situations where safety needs to be a major consideration of exercise planners and field commanders.

**Discussion:** This type of exercise uses a number of realistic field sites where role playing victims are placed under concrete, steel, and other rubble and then cut out of the sites by teams using power or hand tools. The victims are placed in dark and cold sites, and many must remain there until they are extracted. Once removed from the sites, they are evacuated to medical facilities by highway, helicopter, or ship. Helicopters operate 24 hours per day during the exercise and operate from many designated landing zones, some of which are in built up areas. The field crews use heavy equipment and perform manual labor. They must have and use appropriate protective clothing and equipment, and use procedures that are as safe as conditions permit. This exercise was conducted without accidents or mishaps. However, safe handling and processing of the victims is a major concern of all participants, and should be addressed along with other safety issues during the planning conferences, and safe practices need to be enforced at all echelons during the exercise so that injuries can be avoided.

***Recommendation:*** *A safety syndicate should be established during the exercise planning conferences to identify issues and establish procedures to be followed during the exercise to enforce safe conditions.*

#### **g. Employment of Maritime Assets**

**Observation:** Employing a Norwegian Coast Guard ship in this exercise demonstrated the potential contribution of maritime resources during disaster relief operations.

**Discussion:** The Norwegian ship demonstrated the potential contribution of these resources (i.e., ship-borne helicopters, small boats, medical support, power generation, command and control) to the disaster response. Helicopter availability in any disaster is a critical response capability. Many helicopters, reliable command and control, medical care, independent power generation sources, and even billeting and messing services may be required in a major earthquake situation which destroys airfields, command and control capabilities, and other resources.

***Recommendation:** Planners developing future exercises or responding to disaster contingencies in remote locations accessible by sea, such as Iceland, should recognize the potential capabilities marine support affords. Larger scale disasters might be supported by deploying a helicopter carrier type ship, such as is used in amphibious operations, or commercial ships capable of supporting helicopter and command and control operations.*

### **5. Administrative Operations**

#### **a. Distinguished Visitor Program**

**Observation:** Although the NATO Distinguished Visitor (DV) Program for the exercise was successful, planning and execution of the program was not accomplished without some difficulty.

**Discussion:** The responsibility for planning the DV program was assigned to the headquarters scheduling the exercise, ACLANT. Responsibility for executing the program was assigned to the command conducting the exercise, EASTLANT. Selecting the DVs was shared between ACLANT and GOI. Because of prolonged illness of the ACLANT officer assigned the DV task, EASTLANT was required to step in at the final planning conference and both plan and conduct the program. In addition to the NATO DV program, the GOI also invited a number of international guests to observe the exercise and this program was not coordinated with the NATO program. There was little follow-up after the initial NATO invitations were sent to determine who was planning to attend, and some invitees thought the event was canceled. The information packages

received by some of the DVs did not contain an exercise description, the principal reason for their visit.

**Recommendation:** *The command scheduling the exercise should take a proactive role in planning the DV program, inviting the DVs, and following up on who will attend. The information provided to the DVs should contain sufficient descriptions of the event so that the visitors know what they are to observe.*

#### **b. Joint Reception Center Operation**

**Observation:** The operation of the Joint Reception Center was a success and should be incorporated into future exercises and contingency operations.

**Discussion:** The Joint Reception Center (JRC) was established in the air terminal at Keflavik NAS so that all member and partner participants could be administratively processed on arrival and departure. Because all participants arrived either by commercial or military aircraft, the location of the JRC at the air terminal made the processing convenient for the participants. The center was operated efficiently and the carefully prepared orientation briefings and printed material for arriving personnel facilitated the transfer of important information with minimum delay. The JRC also established personnel accounting for all participant personnel from the time of arrival until they departed.

**Recommendation:** *Planners should include similar JRC operations during future exercises and contingency operations.*

#### **c. Public Information Program**

**Observation:** The exercise received excellent media coverage from more than 50 representatives from partner nations as well as large contingents from NATO and the U.S.

**Discussion:** The Public Information Center (PIC) was established in facilities provided by the GOI in Reykjavik. The PIC executed a policy of active coverage that developed story leads based on key exercise messages. The exercise information, including pictures, was also entered on the U.S. Atlantic Command Web Page from the PIC. The partner media teams covered the activities of their teams without adversely impacting on the operations at the exercise sites. As mentioned earlier, press coverage was well managed, not intrusive as might be anticipated in a real world situation. The large number of media representatives required more support – telephone lines, facsimile

machines, vehicles and drivers than was originally planned. The CS-97 brochure prepared by EASTLANT did not include all participating countries, specifically Denmark and Germany.

***Recommendation:** Planning for major Partnership for Peace exercises should include a robust PIC and administrative support to accommodate the media needs. Literature describing the exercise should be carefully screened to ensure that all participants are mentioned. Consideration should be given to including exercise events relating to the presence of aggressive media representatives.*

**APPENDIX A**  
**PARTICIPATING ELEMENTS**

# **SELECTED ELEMENTS OF PARTICIPANTS IN COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD LIVEX**

<u>Country or Organization</u>	<u>Type of Unit</u>
<u>Austria</u>	SAR platoon CIMIC officer Press officer 18 tons support equipment
<u>Canada</u>	Airlift support
<u>Czech Republic</u>	1 Rescue platoon (canceled due to flood crisis at home) 2 Staff officers
<u>Denmark</u>	Logistic support group
<u>Estonia</u>	2 SAR units (2X13 persons) Medical unit Support staff and logistic unit Civilian media representatives PI (national desk representative) Joint staff officers
<u>Finland</u>	2 Staff officers (civilian fire chiefs)
<u>Germany</u>	1 Staff officer
<u>Greece</u>	1 Staff officer
<u>Hungary</u>	1 Staff officer, company or battalion level
<u>Latvia</u>	Triage unit 1 Staff officer 2 Media representatives Up to 10 tons of support equipment
<u>Lithuania</u>	1 Platoon of urban SAR specialists 1xMI-8 Helo with air crew and maintenance support Media representatives Staff officers
<u>Norway</u>	1 CG vessel with 60 embarked personnel aboard 1 Helicopter

**Romania**

2xC-130 with air crew and maintenance support  
SAR Team  
Doctors  
SAR Team logistics officer (for internal logistics)  
Military journalist  
CJTF staff personnel  
Civilian media representative  
3 Special intervention trucks

**Russia**

1xIL-76 with air crew and maintenance support  
B 105 Helicopter with air crew and maintenance detachment  
Air mobile, air deployable field hospital with personnel  
SAR team  
Military journalists (1 press officer, 1 cameraman)  
Staff officers (deputy, air ops, interpreter)

**Sweden**

2 Staff officers

**Ukraine**

1 x IL076 with air crew and maintenance detachment  
SAR team  
Portable refugee camp and setup crew

**United Kingdom**

Staff officers

**United States**

3-142 Aviation Battalion

3X UH-60 (240 hrs.) with air crew and maintenance support

358<sup>th</sup> CA Brigade

Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Cell and Chief (0-5)

56<sup>th</sup> RQS

2x UH-60

G-104<sup>th</sup> Division Company

3xCH-47 (50 hrs.) with air crew and maintenance support

Naval Hospital

Various medical teams

NCB2

Staff officers

NOTE: The above list does not reflect the many participants from Iceland, and a few from other countries invited by the GOI. See Table 1 of this report for a breakdown of the number of participating personnel.



**APPENDIX B**  
**EXERCISE EVENTS**

## Cooperative Safeguard 97 Master Scenario Event List

Date/Time:	Number:	Inject By:	Send To:	Send Mode:	Event Short Description:
01/0800	1.3.4	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass car accident, four cars, many injured
01/0800	2.1.4	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A fish processing plant is collapsed
01/0800	2.3.2			By fax	Large factory
01/0800	3.1.3	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	People trapped in Raufarholscave, some injured
01/0800	3.2.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A greenhouse is severely damaged
01/1000	3.3.6	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse for sheep has collapsed
01/1030	1.3.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A group of twenty people is badly injured
01/1030	3.2.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse has suffered minor damage
01/1100	2.1.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Rope work high angle rope rescue
01/1100	2.5.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Major rubble site at Saltvik, many trapped/injured
01/1130	2.1.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	SAR and medical mission
01/1130	3.4.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A work site house has collapsed
01/1200	0.4.3		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance flight by high voltage wires
01/1200	1.3.5	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A house with smoke for smoke diving
01/1200	3.3.5	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A warehouse, goods have fallen from shelves
01/1300	1.1.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A condominium with four apartments is partially collapsed
01/1310	1.1.3	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Injured people, reported by relatives
01/1330	1.1.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A condominium with four apartments is partially collapsed
01/1330	2.2.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A partially collapsed house
01/1400	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area
01/1400	2.3.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A house is collapsed, only the basement is left
01/1400	3.1.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Confined space rescue from tanks
01/1400	3.3.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Avalanche from Ingolfssjall
01/1500	1.3.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Farmhouse collapsed, few injured
01/1600	1.3.5	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A house with smoke for smoke diving
01/1600	2.1.3	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass car accident, 8-10 cars

Thursday, July 24, 1997

## Cooperative Safeguard 97 Master Scenario Event List

Date/Time:	Number:	Inject By:	Send To:	Send Mode:	Event Short Description:
01/1600	2.4.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Collapsed fish factory, people trapped in basement
01/1630	2.4.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Collapsed house, people trapped inside
01/1630	3.1.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Minor damage, medical mission
01/1630	3.3.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Two houses, severely damaged
01/1730	2.2.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	People trapped in cave in Heimork, some injured
01/2030	1.2.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A building with many rooms collapsed
01/2030	3.1.3	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	People trapped in Raufarholscave, some injured
01/2040	1.2.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A bar is damaged, many injured
01/2100	2.1.5	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Two men trapped in a farmhouse tower
01/2200	1.2.4	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A summerhouse ruins with nine injured
01/2200	2.1.4	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A film processing plant collapsed
01/2200	3.3.3	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Avalanche from Ingolfssjall
01/2330	3.2.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A greenhouse is severely damaged
02/0030	1.3.3	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse rubble site
02/0130	3.3.4	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Confined space rescue, from tanks
02/0300	2.1.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	SAR and medical mission
02/0300	3.3.5	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A warehouse, goods have fallen from shelves
02/0330	2.1.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Rope work high angle
02/0330	2.2.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	People trapped in cave in Heimork, some injured
02/0430	1.1.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Rubble site, degree 2+3 and medical
02/0500	3.2.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse has suffered minor damage
02/0800	1.1.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Rubble site, degree 2+3 and medical
02/0830	2.5.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Major rubble site at Saltvik, many trapped/injured
02/0830	3.1.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Minor damage, medical mission
02/0850	1.1.3	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Injured people, medical mission
02/0900	1.2.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A storehouse with many rooms collapsed

Thursday, July 24, 1997

## Cooperative Safeguard 97 Master Scenario Event List

Date/Time:	Number:	Inject By:	Send To:	Send Mode:	Event Short Description:
02/0900	2.3.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Rubble site, degree 2-5, fire, etc.
02/0930	1.2.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A bar is damaged, many injured
02/0930	3.4.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A work site house has collapsed
02/1000	1.2.4	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A summerhouse rubble with nine injured
02/1030	1.3.3	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse rubble site
02/1030	2.5.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass auto accident on a highway
02/1100	2.4.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Collapsed fish factory, people trapped in basement
02/1100	3.1.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Confined space rescue from tanks
02/1130	2.4.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Collapsed house, people trapped inside
02/1200	1.2.3		CDC on duty	By fax	A whole village, mass casualties
02/1200	2.5.4	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Injured people, medical mission
02/1230	1.3.4	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass car accident, four cars, many injured
02/1230	3.3.3	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Avalanche from Ingolfssjall
02/1400	1.3.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A group of 20 people is badly injured
02/1400	2.1.5	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Two men trapped in a farmhouse tower
02/1400	2.5.3	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A summerhouse partially collapsed
02/1400	3.3.4	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Confined space rescue from tanks
02/1430	2.1.6	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Technical rope rescue Prihnjukarcave, 110 vertical
02/1600	1.3.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Farmhouse collapsed, few injured
02/1600	2.3.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A house collapsed, only the basement is okay
02/1600	3.2.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse has suffered minor damage
02/2000	2.2.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A partially collapsed house
02/2030	1.3.5	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A house with smoke for smoke diving
02/2030	2.2.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	People trapped in cave in Heimork, some injured
02/2030	3.3.6	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse for sheep has collapsed
02/2130	2.1.5	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Two men trapped in a farmhouse tower

Thursday, July 24, 1997

# Cooperative Safeguard 97 Master Scenario Event List

Date/Time:	Number:	Inject By:	Send To:	Send Mode:	Event Short Description:
02/2200	1.3.4	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass car accident, four cars, many injured
02/2300	2.1.4	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A film processing plant is collapsed
02/2300	3.3.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Two houses, severely damaged
03/0100	2.1.3	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass car accident
03/0100	3.3.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Avalanche from Ingolfsfjall
03/0200	1.3.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	Farmhouse collapsed, few injured
03/0330	3.2.2.	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A greenhouse is severely damaged
03/0400	2.5.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass auto accident on highway
03/0400	2.5.3	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A summerhouse partially collapsed
03/0830	2.3.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Rubble site, degree 2-5, fire, etc.
03/0830	2.5.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Major rubble site at Saltvik, many trapped/injured
03/0830	3.1.3	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	People trapped in Rautarholscave, some injured
03/0900	1.2.1	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A stone house with many rooms collapsed
03/0930	1.2.2	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A bar is damaged, many injured
03/1030	3.4.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A whole village, mass casualties in Eyrarbakki
03/1040	3.4.2	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A work site house has collapsed
03/1100	2.1.6	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Technical rope rescue Prihmjukarcave, 110 verified
03/1200	1.2.4	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A summerhouse rubble with nine injured
03/1200	2.3.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A house collapsed, only basement is okay
03/1330	2.1.3	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Mass car accident
04-Anak	0.4.2		CDC on duty	By fax	Transportation of rescue team to disaster area
04-Auka	0.4.3		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance of high voltage wires
04-Auka	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area
04-Auka	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area
04-Auka	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area
04-Auka	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area

Thursday, July 24, 1997

## Cooperative Safeguard 97 Master Scenario Event List

Date/Time:	Number:	Inject By:	Send To:	Send Mode:	Event Short Description:
04-Auka	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area
04-Auka	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area
04-Auka	0.4.4		CDC on duty	By fax	Reconnaissance mission over disaster area
04-Auka	1.2.5	Driver 1	CDC on duty	By fax	A car goes off the road and into a lake
04-Auka	2.1.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Rope work, high angle
04-Auka	2.1.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Rope work, high angle
04-Auka	2.1.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	SAR and medical mission
04-Auka	2.1.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	SAR and medical mission
04-Auka	2.1.5	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Two men trapped in a farmhouse tower
04-Auka	2.2.3	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Car goes off road and into the sea
04-Auka	2.3.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	A house collapsed, only the basement is okay
04-Auka	2.3.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Rubble site, degree 2-5, fire, etc.
04-Auka	2.4.1	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Collapsed fish factory, people trapped in basement
04-Auka	2.4.2	Driver 2	CDC on duty	By fax	Collapsed house, people trapped inside
04-Auka	3.1.1	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Confined space rescue from tanks
04-Auka	3.3.6	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	A farmhouse for sheep has collapsed
04-Auka	3.4.3	Driver 3	CDC on duty	By fax	Car goes off the road and into the sea

**TYPICAL REPORT FROM A DISASTER SITE**  
**(NOTE THAT REPORT NUMBER IS KEYED TO PRECEDING EVENT LIST)**

**Cooperative Safeguard 97: Mission**

The following message/report is given to the CDC on duty in the area. They will take action according to the report and ask for assistance from the EOC.

**Report! Message: Major rubble site at Saltvik, many trapped/injured**

A whole neighborhood has collapsed, condominiums amongst others. Several people are trapped inside, still no reports about injured or dead. A fire is burning in the area, but local people have managed to contain it. Many are lost in the rubble site. Need of USAR and medical teams.

**This emergency is taking place at:**

**Name/Location: Saltvik**

**Number: 2.5.1 Location Lat/Long: 64-12-79 021-48-10**

**APPENDIX C**  
**DISTINGUISHED VISITORS**



## DISTINGUISHED VISITORS FOR CS97 (7/29/97)

Representing	Name	Title
Austria	Mr. Robert Funjok COL Furenhoster	Dir. Of Dept. of Civil Protection Minister of Defense
Canada	Dr. Eric Shipley	Ex. Dir. Emergency Preparedness, Canada
EASTLANT	VADM Cees van Duyvendijk LT Andre Van der kamp	Deputy Commander in Chief Aide to VADM Vanduyvindijk
Iceland	Thorsteinn Ingolfsson	Perm. Rep. of Iceland to NAC
IL & CEP NATO	Mr. Jonkeer van Foreest	Asst. Gen. Sec. for IL & CEP
IMS	MG Groenheim	Asst. Dir. Logistics & Resources Div.
Italy	Pref Guilio Maninchedda Madam Anna Manichedda	Minister of the Interior Wife of Minister
Kyrghyz Republic	Mr. Mmambetdjunos Abylov	Min. of Emergency & Civil Defense
Lithuania	Col. Gediminas Polukas	Dir. Of Dept. of Civil Security
Norway	Ms Helen Bosterud  LTG Per Bothuen Mrs. Malfrid Bothuen	Dir. Gen. Civil Defense & Emergency Plan Norwegian Mil. Rep to NATO Wife of LTG Bothuen
NATO PCC	MG Luigi Paolo Zema	Representative of the Director
Romania	CPT Cmdr. Anghel Gheorghe  Div. Gen. Gheorghe Popescu	Rep. Of Gen. Maj. State of Defense Min. Command, Romanian Civil Protection Command
Russia	First Vice Min. Vorobiev Mr. Viacheslav Vlasenko	EMERCON Translator for Minister Vorobiev

SACLANT	GEN J.J. Sheehan VADM Michael Gretton CDR Frank Buerger  CDR Kuijper COL Adair Mr. James Cason ETCS Acheson	Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic SACLANT Representative in Europe Mil. Assist. To Spec. Assist. Inter. Affairs Aide to GEN Sheehan Executive Assist. to GEN Sheehan Special Assist. Int. Affairs Communicator, GEN Sheehan
SCEPC	Mr. R. Johns  Mr. Stephen Orosz	Sec. SCEPC Head of Emergency Plan. Dep. Dir. Emergency Planning
Sweden	Mr. Sture Ericson	Director General
Switzerland	Mr. Charles Raedersdorf	Del. For Humanitarian Aid & Chief of SKH
Ukraine	Mr. V Vashchenko	Chief of Civil Defense HDQS
USA	RADM Thomas Hall Ms Nan Borton  Dr. Clair Blong  Ms. Kay Goss  Mrs. Sheila Dryden  Mr. Gegard Bradford  Mr. L. Mandroc	Dir. Naval Reserve Association Dir. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Dir. Of International Programs, USAID Asst. Dir. Prep. Training & Exercise, FEMA Principal Director, Emerg. Preparedness (OSD) Asst. Dir. for Operational Support, OSD USDA Emergency Coordinator

**APPENDIX D**  
**SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION**

## **Words of Welcome From the Exercise Director**

### **Welcome to Iceland**

"Iceland has been struck by a catastrophic earthquake causing major damage and casualty loss. The command structure is still intact and Icelandic authorities are in control of the situation. However, they are lacking in trained manpower and specialized equipment and have accepted offers of international aid. The United Nations, Disaster Relief Coordination Branch, Geneva, have sent UNDAC teams (UN Disaster Assistance Coordination teams) to Iceland, which are assisting the National Civil Defense of Iceland in coordinating the international efforts. NATO/PfP nations are sending search and rescue personnel to support the on-going activities of the Iceland emergency response system. The national response system has been overwhelmed for 15 hours when the foreign teams arrive in Iceland. Icelandic teams will be in the field when NATO/PfP teams arrive."

Over 1000 Icelandic emergency response personnel are participating in Cooperative Safeguard 97; including civil defense committees, incident commanders, police, fire personnel, hospital personnel, search and rescue teams, Icelandic Coast Guard, Red Cross volunteers, national infrastructure agencies, governmental agencies and others.

Cooperative Safeguard 97 exercises the implementation of international rescue teams into a national response system. For successful operations the team leaders must familiarize themselves with the command and control system (see Field Event Guidelines) and follow the chain of command.

One of the goals of this exercise is to have the international units work along side the Icelandic units, and the various international units work together; to learn, to teach, to establish contacts and to broaden the horizons of those that save lives in the aftermath of tragic disasters.

Have a challenging and safe exercise.

/s/

Ms. Solveig Thorvaldsdottir, Exercise Director  
Director for The National Civil Defense of Iceland

## General information

### Controllers

Each field event will have a controller to give information about the event and for safety. The controller will have an orange band on his/her arm marked: Efirilit / Controller. Exercise participants must obey the controller.

### Helicopters and landing zones

- Not every field event has a landing zone.
- The controller will tell the rescue team if and where the landing zone is for the event
- The crew will be given detailed information on the location of the landing zones before they leave the airport.
- The controller will light a flare for the NATO/PPP teams when helicopters are used.
- Communication between the rescue team and the crew will take place after the helicopter has landed.
- Helicopters will not be flown in urban areas between 23:00 and 07:00.

### Real Emergencies

Real accidents should be notified in the following manner:

- Before notification of a real event say the words **NO PLAY** three times.
- Notify the controller of the accident.
- Notify the force escort of the event.

## Field Event Guidelines



### Almannavarnir ríkisins

Seljaveg 32, 101 Reykjavík.

Sími: 568-5001 Símbref: 562-2665

### National Civil Defense of Iceland

Seljaveg 32, 101 Reykjavík, Iceland  
Phone: 568-5001 Fax: 562-2665

International Earthquake Exercise

ICELAND 1997


## General information

### Welcome to Cooperative Safeguard 97

Cooperative Safeguard 97 exercises an international response to a major earthquake. The command of the operation is in the hands of the host nation, Iceland.

### Command Structure

The command structure is the Icelandic Civil Defence command structure for major disasters. The Civil Defence Committees are in charge of operations within their jurisdictions. AVRIK (National Civil Defence of Iceland), with the assistance of the United Nations, directs the assisting NATO/PPP forces into the stricken area. All field units work under the command of an Icelandic Incident Commander. (See diagram).



### Force Escorts

All NATO / PPP field units will be assigned vehicles and force escorts that are links to the Incident Commander (IC). The Force escorts are also drivers for the teams. The Force escorts have radios with the Icelandic SAR frequency, and can ensure communication with the IC. All NATO /PPP teams will also have mobile phones to communicate with the CJTF / KHS.

## Urban Search and Rescue

### Upon arrival at rubble site

Prior to working on the rubble the team leader must get clearance from the site controller for information on rules specific to the site

### Markings

#### YELLOW

Places marked with yellow tape or yellow coloring are out of bounds.

#### GREEN

Places marked with green tape or green coloring may be cut through, breached or broken.

If there are no markings, then there are no restrictions, unless specified by the controller.

### Victim Transportation

Caution should be used when transporting victims in rubble piles or in high areas.

### End of Event

All patients should be transported from the field events to the central triage centers/casualty collection points, unless otherwise stated by the IC or controller. Some events will end when the victim has been extricated from the building and moved 100 meters from the site.

## First Aid / Triage Units

### Victims / Role Players

can be both people and dolls.

The dolls are both "deceased" and "injured" people with a description of their injuries and are to be handled accordingly.

### Patient Handling (for live role players)

-Check breathing. Tell role player the breathing rate. The role player will tell the rescuer the exercise breathing rate.

-Pulse will be told to the rescuer after the rescuer has taken the pulse of the role player.

-Blood pressure will be told to the rescuer after the rescuer has taken the blood pressure.

-Body temperature will be told to the rescuer after the rescuer has taken the temperature. Use oral or tympanic thermometer.

### Wound dressing and splints

- Stop bleeding and apply bandages to "wounds"  
- Apply splints to "fractures".

### Advanced Care

-Do not set up an I.V., tape plastic needle to the patient.  
-Do not intubate, tape tube to patient's neck.

*See: Exercise Guidelines for First Aid, Triage Units and Hospital Personnel.*

Waste: All waste and needles should be disposed of in a yellow container supplied by the controllers.

## Общая информация

### Контролеры

Каждый полетный случай будет иметь контролера, чтобы дать информацию относительно события и для безопасности. Контролер будет иметь оранжевую полосу на его/ее руке с надписью: Eflirli/Controller. Участники тренировки должны повиноваться контролеру.

### Вертолеты и приземляющиеся зоны

- Не каждое полетное событие имеет приземляющуюся зону.
- Контролер сообщит спасательной командой если и где приземляющаяся зона для события находится.
- Экипажу дадут детальную информацию относительно местоположения приземляющихся зон прежде, чем они улетают от аэропорта.
- Контролер зажжет вспышку для бригад NATO/IFP, когда вертолеты используются.
- Связь между спасательной командой и экипажем будет иметь место после того, как вертолет приземлился.
- Вертолеты не прилетают городские области между 23:00 и 07:00.

### Настоящее критическое положение

Настоящие несчастные случаи должны быть

- До уведомления о реальном случае говорите слова NO PLAY три раза.
- Уведомите контролера относительно несчастного случая.
- Уведомите эскорт сил относительно случая.

## Директивы полевого события



### Almannavarnir ríkisins

Seljaveg 32, 101 Reykjavík

Sími: 568-5001 Símbréf: 562-2665

### National Civil Defense of Iceland

Seljaveg 32, 101 Reykjavík, Iceland

Phone: 568-5001 Fax: 562-2665

Международная землетрясенная  
тренировка


Исландия 1997

## Общая информация

**Добро пожаловать в Совместную Охрану 97**  
Совместная Охрана 97 тренирует между-народную реакцию в случае крупного землетрясения.  
Управление действий находится в руках страны - организатора, Исландии.

### Субординация

Субординацией является субординация Гражданской Обороны Исландии для крупных бедствий. Комитеты Гражданской обороны отвечают за действия в их юрисдикции пределах. AVRIK (Национальная Гражданская оборона Исландии), с помощью Организации Объединенных Наций, направляет помощь сил НАТО/Товарищество на Мир (Partnership for Peace/PPF) в пораженной области. Все полевые единицы работают под командой Исландского Командующего Инцидента. (См. диаграмму).



### Эскорты Сил

Всем НАТО/PPF полевым единицам будут назначенные транспортные средства и эскорты сил, которые являются связями Командующему Инцидента (Incident Commander/IC). Эскорты Сил - также водители бригад. Эскорты Сил имеют радио на Исландской SAR частоте, и могут гарантировать связь с IC-ом.

Все НАТО/PPF бригады будут также иметь мобильные телефоны, чтобы связаться с CJTF/KHS.

## Городской Поиск и Спасение

**По достижению на место буга**  
Лю работы в буге руководитель группы должен получить проведение расчета от контролера участка для информации относительно правил, определенных к участку.

### Маркировка

#### ЖЕЛТОЕ

Места, отмеченные с желтой лентой или желтой окраской находятся вне граппы.

#### ЗЕЛЕНО

Места, отмеченные с зеленой лентой или зеленой окраской можно пройти, разрушить или сломать.

Если нет маркировки, тогда не имеется никаких ограничений, если не определено диспетчером.

### Транспортирование жертв

Предостережение должно использоваться при транспортировке жертв в кучах буги или в высоких местах.

### Конеч события

Все стороны должны транспортироваться от полных случаев до центрального места сортировки / пункта собраний жертв, если иначе не заявлено IC-ом или контролером. Некоторые случаи являются, когда жертва высвобождена из здания и перемещаются 100 метров от участка.

## Скорая помощь/Единицы Сортировки

### Жертвы / Игроки-участники

могут быть и люди и куклы. Куклы и "мертвые" и "раненые" люди с описанием их травм, и с ним надо обращаться соответственно.

### Обращение с Пациентами (для живых игроков-участников)

- Проверьте дыхание. Сообщите игроку-участнику скорость дыхания. Игрок-участник сообщит спасателю скорость дыхания в тренировке.

- Пульс будет скакаться спасателю после того, как спасатель принял пульс игрока-участника.

- Кровяное давление будет скакаться спасателю после того, как спасатель принял кровяное давление.

- Температура тела будет скакаться спасателю после того, как спасатель принял температуру. Используйте устный или ушной термометр.

### Перевязка ран и луковок

- Останавливайте кровотечение и перевязывайте "раны" бандажкой  
- Наложите локти к "переломам"

### Специальная забота

- Не установите L.V. (иглу), оклеивайте властмассовую иглу лентой на пациент.  
- Не делайте интубацию, оклеивайте лентой трубу к носу пациента

**См.: Руководящие принципы тренировки) для скорой помощи, единиц сортировки и персонала больницы.**

**Мусор:** Весь мусор и иглы надо убрать бросать в желтые контейнеры, снабженные диспетчерами.




F 054676



F 054676



F 054676



METTAG © 1983 JOURNAL OF CIVIL DEFENSE  
P.O. BOX 910, STARKE, FLORIDA 32091, U.S.A.  
All Rights Reserved



	/	/	/

(iv)



(im)



0



0



0

||



F 054676

||



||



**APPENDIX E**

**ACRONYMS**

## APPENDIX E

### ACROYNMS

ACE	Allied Command Europe (NATO)
ACLANT	Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)
AMCC	Allied Mobility Coordination Center (NATO)
AVRIK	Organization for National Civil Defense [ <i>Almannavarnir</i> <i>Ríkisins</i> ] (Iceland)
CDC	Civil Defense Center (Iceland)
CFX	Command Field Exercise
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CINCEASTLANT	Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic (NATO)
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COMICEDEFOR	Commander Iceland Defense Force (US)
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CS-97	Cooperative Safeguard 97
DISTAFF	Directing Staff
DV	Distinguished Visitor
EASTLANT	Eastern Atlantic Command (NATO)
EOC	Emergency Operations Center (Iceland)
FPC	Final Planning Conference
GOI	Government of Iceland
GPS	Global Positioning System
ICAA	Iceland Civil Aviation Administration
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IDF	Iceland Defense Force (US)
INSARG	International Search and Rescue Group
IPC	Initial Planning Conference
ISCOMICELAND	Island Commander Iceland (NATO)
J-1	Joint Director of Personnel
J-3	Joint Director of Operations
J-4	Joint Director for Logistics
JCP	Joint Command Post (IDF)

JRC	Joint Reception Center (NATO)
KHS	Keflavik High School
LIVEX	Live Exercise
LRC	Logistics Readiness Cell (NATO)
MNC	Major NATO Command
MPC	Main Planning Conference
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
NAS	Naval Air Station
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCR	Naval Construction Regiment
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OPCON	Operational Control
OSOCC	On Site Operations Coordination Center
PC	Personal Computer
PCC	Partnership Coordination Cell
PIC	Public Information Center (NATO)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
POL	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (NATO)
SAR	Search and Rescue
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
STANAG	Standard Agreement
STX	Situational Training Exercise
TACON	Tactical Control
TOA	Transfer of Authority
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps

**DISTRIBUTION LIST  
U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND (USACOM)  
EXERCISE COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD 1997 (CS-97)  
AFTER ACTION REPORT**

**A. Major Participating Commands and NATO  
Members and Partners**

CDR Robert W. Fish, USN U.S. Atlantic Command Joint Training and Analysis Center Code ACJ712 116 Lakeview Parkway Suite 150 Suffolk, VA 23435-2697	10
LTC Ron Johnson, USMC U.S. Atlantic Command Plans and Policy Directorate (ACJ552) Norfolk, VA 23551-2488	2
LCDR Scott E. Thomas, USN Headquarters, Iceland Defense Force ATTN: J-51 PCS 1003, Box 1 FPO AE 09728-0301	35 (15 internal, 15 GOI, 5 discretionary)
LTCOL Mike Boldosser, USAF Permanent Staff Element Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) APO AE 09705	50 (Partner and NATO nations, and NATO commands associated with PfP (less EASTLANT and SACLANT))
CDR Ferdinand Salomon, USN CINCEASTLANT PSC 821, Box 107 FPO AE 09421-0107	4 (Internal)
CDR Jose Brou, PON Exercise Branch C-387 SACLANT Headquarters 7857 Blandy Road, Suite 100 Norfolk, VA 23551-2490	4 (Internal)

## **B. OSD, Joint Staff, and Other DoD Headquarters**

Mr. Amit Pandya Director for Humanitarian Affairs Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Strategy and Requirements Pentagon, Room 1D477 Washington, DC 20301	2
Mr. Maxwell Alston Director of Emergency Planning Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) Pentagon (Room 1D460) Washington, DC 20301	2
Mr. Vince Roske Deputy Director for Wargaming, Simulation, and Operations Joint Staff, J8 Pentagon, Room 1E965 Washington, DC 20318	1
LT COL Bill Saunders, USAF Joint Staff J7 (JETD) Pentagon, Room 2B857 Washington, DC 20318	1
Mr. Josh Spero Joint Staff, J5 (Political Military Affairs) Pentagon, Room 2D956 Washington, DC 20318	1
Ms Mary Ellen Perlman Office of the FEMA Representative U.S. Mission NATO APO AE 09724-5000	2
Major Maggie West, ANG National Guard Bureau (ARO-OY) 4000 Arlington Blvd. Arlington, VA 22212	1
LTC Steve Alvarado, USA Headquarters, U.S. European Command ATTN: ECJ37 Unit 30400, Box 1000 APO AE 09128	1

**B. OSD, Joint Staff, and Other DoD Headquarters  
(Cont'd)**

LtCol R. Songer, USMC 1  
Headquarters, U.S. European Command  
ATTN: ECJ4-IDH  
Unit 30400, Box 1000  
APO AE 09128

LTC Steve Hebert, USA 1  
Marshall Center  
Unit 24502, Box 167  
APO AE 09053

**C. Civilian Agencies**

Mr. Tom Frey 2  
BHR/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
1400 Wilson Blvd (Room 1705)  
Rosslyn, VA 22209

Mr. Dennis Atwood 2  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Exercise Division (PT-EX-EV)  
500 C Street, SW  
Washington, DC 20472

LT Ruben D. Almaguer 1  
Response Readiness Coordinator  
Metro-Dade Fire Rescue  
6000 S.W. 87th Avenue  
Miami, FL 33173

Deputy Chief James M. Strickland 2  
Division II  
Fire and Rescue Department  
County of Fairfax  
4100 Chain Bridge Road  
Fairfax, VA 22030

Mr. Ola Almgren 1  
Chief, Field Coordination Support Unit  
Department of Humanitarian Affairs  
DHA Geneva  
Palais des Nations  
CH 1211 GENEVA 10, Switzerland

#### **D. Participating Commands**

CPT Ronald Pettit, ARNG 2  
3rd Battalion, 142nd Aviation Regiment  
330A Old Niskayuma Rd.  
Latham, NY 12110-2225

CW3 George M. Jones, ARNG 2  
G Company, 104th Aviation Battalion  
9 Sycamore Ct.  
Ramsey, NJ 07446

Commander 2  
2nd Naval Construction Brigade  
ATTN: N-725 (LT Irwin)  
1310 8th St Suite 100  
Norfolk, VA 23521-2435

Commander 1  
56th RQS  
FPO AE 09421-0107

LTC Sam Evans USAR 1  
358th Civil Affairs Brigade  
1020 Sandy St  
Norristown, PA 19401

CDR Oeystein K. Wemberg 1  
NOCV ANDENES  
PO Box 295  
8401 SORTLAND  
Norway

LtCol Niels Arne Jensen 1  
Logistics Support Group  
HVORUP Barracks  
9400 NR SUNDBY  
Denmark

#### **E. Other**

Institute for Defense Analyses 15

Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) 2  
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Ste. 0944  
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218



<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE October 1997		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final; November 1996 - October 1997
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Exercise Cooperative Safeguard 1997 (CS-97) After Action Report			5. FUNDING NUMBERS DASW01-94-C-0054, OUSD(A) Task no. T-H9-1323	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mr. A. Martin Lidy RADM Samuel H. Packer, USN (Ret.)				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard St. Alexandria, VA 22311-1772			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER IDA Document D-2080	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) CDR Robert W. Fish, U.S. Atlantic Command Joint Training and Analysis Center, Code ACJ712 116 Lakeview Pkwy., Ste. 150 Suffolk, VA 23435-2697			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review (OASD-PA), 10 February 1998.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)  This document provides a summary of Exercise COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD '97. It contains observations from the exercise and recommendations pertinent to the planning and conduct of similar exercises in the future. The document was prepared for the US Atlantic Command. This unique and successful event was the first NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise to be hosted by the Government of Iceland and one of the first PfP exercises to use a natural disaster as the scenario. The exercise, scheduled by the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and conducted by the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic, consisted of two phases: a Command Post Exercise in June 1977 followed by a Live Exercise in July with eight NATO and eleven PfP nations participating.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS US Atlantic Command, Government of Iceland, National Civil Defense, COOPERATIVE SAFEGUARD, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, Partnership for Peace, exercise			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 96	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	